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Smolin: Conflict and Ideology in the International Campaign Against Child

CONFLICT AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHILD
LABOUR
David M. Smolin*

I. INTRODUCTION

The accelerating international campaign against child labour targets some of the most tragic phenomena of the contemporary world.
Millions of children are economically exploited in ways that permanently harm them. The shocking stories of young children sold into the
carpet industry, tied to their looms for twelve or more hours a day, or
sold or lured into the sex industry, have captured the imagination of the
world.'
Activists and commentators have blamed an odd combination of
deeply-embedded cultural traditions and highly contemporary economic
globalism for this tragic phenomenon. Traditional cultural attitudes
which view child labour as normal, useful, and a positive form of preparation for adult life, the remnants of hierarchical social and economic
arrangements such as the caste system, and certain traditional gender
attitudes, are viewed as contributing toward extreme forms of child labour such as bonded child labour and even child prostitution. At the
same time, it is frequently claimed that the globalization and internationalization of the economy has exacerbated the child labour problem,
by causing children to become exploited parts of the world system of
trade in ways different from, and sometimes worse than, that found under traditional forms of child labour.'
The child labour movement thus finds itself in the odd position of
challenging two contradictory yet deeply characteristic aspects of the
contemporary world: neo-traditonalism, in which ethnic identities, national sovereignty, and traditional ways of life are being re-asserted, and
an international economic order based increasingly on international
trade and competition.5 The underlying tensions between localization
* Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University; Fellow, Southern Center for Law and Ethics. The author wishes to thank Mike Debow for his review of and comments
on a written draft of this Article, and Hans Baldau and Shea Carroll for their research assistance.
1. See, e.g, Jonathan Silvers, Child Labour in Pakistan, 277 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 79,
88 (Feb. 1996).
2. See id. at 80.
3. See Claudia Brewster, Note, Restoring Childhood: Saving the World's Children From
Toiling in Textile Sweatshops, 16 J.L. & COM. 191, 192-93 (1996); Silvers, supra note 1, at 80.
4. See, e.g., Silvers, supra note 1; Brewster, supra note 3, at 191, 199.
5. See generally Brewster, supra note 3 (arguing that the child labour problem requires an
analysis from several vantage points including world economics, international law, public policy
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and internationalization, between cultural particularities and economic
standardization and universalism, are a striking characteristic of the
contemporary world.6 The child labour movement is in many respects an
ambitious attempt to shape the accommodation and resolution of these
tensions by altering the system of international trade to include a global
abolition of child labour imposed through a system of international legal
instruments, while simultaneously overcoming deeply-embedded cultural traditions that facilitate child labour.7
This ambitious program of altering both international and local
norms, attitudes, and practices is endangered by tensions between the
developed and developing world.' Developing nations, while generally
acknowledging that abusive forms of child labour within their borders
should be abolished, are concerned that the child labour campaign will
be used as a means to further disadvantage developing nations in the
emerging system of international trade.9 This fear that the child labour
campaign will lead to various kinds of trade sanctions or consumer boycotts targeting the economic products of developing nations, and indeed
that the child labour movement will be used by the developed world to
further exploit and repress the developing world, threatens to undermine
the unity of purpose necessary to the movement.'0
The child labour movement is in many respects a characteristic part
of the larger international human rights movement, which in recent
years has created a particularly ambitious group of human rights conventions which appear to demand significant changes in traditional cultural practices." The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), for example, explicitly
requires state parties to "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women" to eliminate all practices based on
"stereotyped roles for men and women."'" The international human
rights movement has in recent years focused on the rights of the child,
as exemplified by the very widely ratified 1989 Convention on the

6. See Anthony G. Freeman, ChildLabor's Impact on Free Trade, CONG. TESTIMONY, Oct.
22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14152423.

7. See id.
8. See id.; see also Silvers, supra note 1, at 85 (discussing Pakistan's acceptance of the present situation and its intent to maintain traditions which have favorably served the upper class).
9. See Freeman, supranote 6.
10. See id. (discussing North-South split).
11. See id.
12. United Nations: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 19 LL.M. 33, art. 5(a) (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW].
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Rights of the Child ("CRC").13 The CRC explicitly requires State Parties
to protect children from hazardous and harmful employment, to ensure
that employment does not interfere with a child's education, and to establish minimum ages for employment. 4 Thus, the child labour movement is in many respects a part of the international child rights movement.
The terminology child labour, however, correctly suggests the related but distinct role of the labour movement as primary contributor to
the child labour movement. Thus, the International Labour Organization
("ILO") has established itself as perhaps the most significant force in
the child labour movement. 5 The ILO has been active since 1919 in
creating conventions related to minimum ages of employment, and
therefore has had the most time to develop expertise and experience in
the field. 6 The economic and employment foci of the child labour
movement also stem from the competence and credibility of the ILO in
those fields. The ILO, of course, is in many respects an important actor
in the modem international human rights movement, and the fact that
the ILO predates both the United Nations and the modem era of international human rights law by more than a quarter-century gives the organization a certain degree of credibility and weight, particularly within
its core areas of competence.' s The ambitious hope of the child labour
movement to create universal rules which alter the global regimen of
international trade, as well as altering local economic and labour conditions throughout the world, stems from the long experience of the ILO
in the fields of employment and labour conditions.' 9
This article constitutes a critique of the child labour movement,
and particularly of the developing approach of the 1LO to the problem
of child labour. Acceptance of a moral imperative to protect children
from profoundly destructive situations and practices does not eliminate

13. United Nations: Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989). For a list
of ratifying nations, see 18 Hum. RTS. I. at 90 (1997) (listing 118 ratifications).
14. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.LM. arts. 1, 28, 32.
15. See Efr~n C6rdova, Some Reflections on the Overproduction of InternationalLabor
Standards,14 COmp. LAB. L.J. 138, 138 (1993).
16. See ILO C5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919 (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http:/ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.plC5> [hereinafter ILO C5 (Industry) Convention].
17. See C6rdova, supranote 15, at 140-141.
18. See generally ABDUL-KARIM TIKRrI, TRIPARTISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION (1982) (giving overview of the ILO); see also Freeman, supra note 6 (describing
the ILO's work and mission).
19. See Freeman, supra note 6; see also C6rdova, supra note 15, at 140-41 (explaining the
expansion of the aims and purposes of the ILO).
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the difficult task of carefully defining the evils involved and devising
effective strategies that can combat them. The sometimes sentimental
subject of children, in other words, should not be an occasion for fuzzy
thinking. Thus, although many of the goals of the campaign to eliminate
child labour are certainly laudable, this does not eliminate the need to
closely examine and critique the campaign. Good intentions are not
enough, particularly in relation to children, for children generally must
live with the actual effects of efforts made on their behalf, and are in
many situations unable to mitigate those effects or to protect themselves. In addition, the emotional appeal of children makes them, as a
class, particularly vulnerable to ideological exploitation."0 An economically exploited child can become a poster child for a movement with
much broader purposes than protecting children. Moreover, a mandate
of "protecting children" can beg fundamental questions of value and
human nature, for the question of what is "good for children" can
sometimes imply presuppositions about what is good for human beings
generally. For all of these reasons, the child labour movement deserves
a sympathetic, yet critical, examination.
It. FUNDAMENTAL TENSIONS IMPLICATED BY THE CAMPAIGN TO
ABOLISH CHILD LABOUR

The accelerating campaign to abolish child labour implicate at least
four fundamental tensions which threaten to splinter the movement,
paralyze its efforts, and reduce international support and enthusiasm.2 '
These four tensions include the question of linking labour standards and
trade, the definition of the final goal of the movement, the conflict between norm-based international human rights and cultural, familial, and
personal autonomy, and an ongoing credibility crisis within the human
rights field.' The capacity of the movement to navigate these tensions
will determine in large part how much actual effectiveness the movement demonstrates.
A. Linkage Between LabourStandardsand Trade
The campaign against child labour raises the divisive question of
whether international child labour standards should be linked to inter20. See Silvers, supranote 1, at 82.
21. See C6rdova, supra note 15, at 144.

22. See id.
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national trade standards. The spectre of such a linkage brings to the fore
underlying tensions between developed and developing nations, which
are often understood as a "North-South" division. 5 Since most child labourers are found in the developing world (the South), 24 any fundamental division between North and South would cripple the child labour
movement.25
Developing nations have been consistently hostile for some time to
any linkage between labour standards and international trade.26 Some
developed nations, and particularly workers' groups within the developed world, tend to favor such linkage.27 This conflict has intensified as
international trade rules have become increasingly liberalized and as the
world economy has become increasingly integrated.' This conflict goes
to the heart of the theory of free trade and the definition of its opposite,
protectionism. According to the basic economic theory of free trade,
free trade maximizes the wealth of all because it encourages each nation
to produce those goods and services in which it has a "comparative advantage," such that it can produce those goods and services most efficiently." A "comparative advantage" can be the result of natural resources or climate, or it can be the result of accumulated expertise and
investment.3" Whether the product be oil, oranges, or automobiles, the
costs of production usually vary from place to place, and the nation with
the lowest production costs possesses a comparative advantage over
other nations.32 The theory of free trade thus implies economic specialization, for it suggests that each geographic area concentrate in producing those goods and services in which it has a comparative advantage,
while relying on other geographic areas for those goods and services in
which it lacks a comparative advantage.33 Free trade thus theoretically
allows consumers to purchase goods and services from their most efficient and low-cost producers. 34

23. See Freeman, supra note 6.

24. See id.
25. See id.

26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Freeman, supra note 6.

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Freeman, supra note 6.
34. See, e.g., id.; THE CASEAGAINST FREETRADE 122, 124-26, 139-141.
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Illegitimate protectionism occurs when a nation, through tariffs,
taxes, dumping, or subsidies, tries to provide an unfair advantage for
their national industries over those of other nations, hence inefficiently
distorting the system of free trade.35 Nations may use protectionist
measures to protect domestic jobs and industries, or because they wish
to attain self-reliance in certain necessities, such as food. The difficulty
with protectionism, of course, is that it builds upon itself. A nation that
enacts protectionist measures to protect its own jobs is likely to produce
protectionist responses from other nations.
The current world trade system permits some degree of tariffs and
other protectionist measures, but seeks to avoid a spiral of protectionism
by creating universally-applicable limits to such protectionist measures. 6 The effort to produce a balanced, fair system of trade is complicated by the fact that protectionist effects can be produced in ways more
subtle than the obvious means of tariffs and subsidies." Hence, issues
such as Japan's efforts (or lack thereof) to "stimulate" their economy or
remove complex barriers to their markets can become a part of the free
trade debate. The presence or absence of regulatory regimes that affect
production costs, such as environmental controls, can also become trade
issues, for it can seem both unwise and unfair for some nations to
achieve
a trade advantage by uncontrolled destruction of the environ38
ment.
One current difficulty with the world trade regimen, then, is that
many of the factors that affect production costs are not clearly defined
as either legitimate comparative advantage or illegitimate protectionism.
Thus, while few would cite the absence of environmental controls as a
positive "comparative advantage," if the World Trade Organization
("WTO") does not treat it as illicit protectionism, nations can in fact attain trade advantages through such dubious means.39 Regional trading
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), 4 may, with various degrees of effectiveness, regulate such
factors, but their status remains largely indeterminate.4'

35. See Freeman, supra note 6.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE, supranote 34, at 6-11, 29.
39. See World Trade Organization: Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221
(1997) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration].
40. North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (Supp. V.
1993).
41. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 39, at 221.
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The fundamental issue posed by a potential linkage between labour
standards and trade is the degree to which the lower labour costs of the
developing world constitute a "comparative advantage" which the world
trade system should respect, or an illicit form of "protectionism" which
should be abolished." Industries dependent on relatively low-skill labour, such as apparel, toys, and textiles, have centered production in the
developing world largely because of its substantially lower labour
costs an illeCoStS. 43 To what degree, however, are these lower labour
44
subsidies?
to
comparable
protectionism
of
form
gitimate
Some within the developed world, including particularly workers'
groups, consider that to the degree that labour costs are lower because
of a failure to honor labour standards or the fundamental rights of workers, such lower labour costs constitute illegitimate protectionism, rather
than proper comparative advantage.45 Workers within the developed
world feel keenly the affects of the globalization of the labour market
through the shifting of jobs to low-cost developing nations. 46 The realization of workers within the developed world that they must compete
with workers in the developing world naturally leads to the desire that
all should compete under the same rules, including the same set of
minimum labour standards and workers' rights.'
Many within the developing world, however, consider their lower
labour costs to be a proper comparative advantage which is an inevitable feature of their stage of economic and social development, rather
than being due to the violation of universal standards or rights.48 In a
highly competitive world market, developing nations fear that this advantage of lower labour costs will be prematurely liquidated through the
arbitrary imposition of labour standards. 49 The developing world bitterly
recalls being economically exploited during the era of Northern coloni42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See generally GOTE HANSSON, SOCIAL CLAUSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1983)
(studying the linkage issue).
45. See Anthony G. Freeman, Child Labor'sImpact on Free Trade, CONG. TESTIMONY, Oct.
22, 1997, available in 1997 VL 14152423.
46. See id.
47. See id. Senator Tom Harkin's negative view of the use of lower wages as a comparative
advantage reflects the views of some in the North. "Ifa Third World country wants to compete in
the global economy, what does it have to compete with? Cheap labour. And the cheapest source of
labour is kids .... So .... GATT could.., be a stimulus to using more child labour in the third
world." Mitchell Zuckoff, Free Trade, Human Rights Clash Over GATT, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30,
1994, available in 1994 WL 6007501.
48. See Freeman, supra note 45.
49. See id.
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zation, and tends to view world trade rules promoted by the developed
world as a means of further economic exploitation of the developing
world.50 The developing world feels keenly its economic vulnerability to
organizations, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), and the WTO, which are dominated by the richer Northern na-

tions. Even where such organizations are theoretically established in
part for the benefit of the developing world, the tendency of those
Northern-dominated organizations to impose economic programs on the
vulnerable Southern nations naturally produces significant resentment,

particularly since such imposed economic programs often produce significant economic dislocation.5 Under such circumstances, the developing world tends to view any linkage between labour standards and trade

as yet another Northern means to economically exploit Southern nations.51
Currently, no formal linkage exists between labour standards and
the world trade regime.53 International institutions responsible for trade,
such as the WTO, have generally declaimed any expertise in regard to
labour standards, while the ILO lacks any jurisdiction in regard to trade
issues.5 Efforts to produce formal linkage has produced merely rhetorical WTO support for labour standards and for ILO expertise.5 Thus, it is
entirely possible for a nation to flaunt 1LO labour standards without
being penalized through the WTO trade framework. The primary check
occurs through unilateral or regional restraints, such as a recent United

States ban on imports produced by bonded child labour.56 Unilateral ef50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. For the WTO's treatment of the linkage issue, see Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 39 (discussing the WTO's treatment of the linkage issue).
53. See Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Note, Child Labour, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonizationof InternationalLaw, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 663 (1997).
54. See id. at 663 & n.7.
55. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 39, at 221. The paragraph on "Core
Labour Standards" reads:
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour
standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set
and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting
them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade
and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject
the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative
advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be
put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.
Id.
56. See Matt Moffett, U.S. Child-Labour Law Sparks a Trade Debate Over Brazilian Or-
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forts to enforce labour standards through trade sanctions, however, are
themselves
subject to being treated as illicit protectionism under
57
GATT
The markedly increased ILO focus on the child labour issue, however, threatens the status quo on the linkage issue. Some, for example,
have argued that at least the worst forms of child labour constitute a
violation of peremptory norms of international law which must be considered implicit parts of world trade conventions. 8 Some forms of activism against child labour, such as consumer boycotts of goods possibly
produced by child labour, the corollary creation of labels signifying
goods produced without child labour, and recent agreements reached
with employer groups representing certain industries in the developed
world, all have produced de facto linkages between child labour and international trade between the developing and developed world" The
possibility of such linkages are therefore an increasingly present reality
in the child labour debate.
Child labour does have a significant impact on labour costs in several ways. First, child labourers are often paid a small fraction of what
an adult would be paid for the same amount of work. 6° Second, the
large-scale inclusion of children in the labour force, particularly in the
demographically young developing world, significantly raises the number of potential workers and thereby depresses the overall labour market. Workers in the developed world already resent competing with lowcost adult labour in the developing world; 61 the prospect of competing
with millions of ill-paid children is not a happy one for the workers of
the developed world. Child labour is, of course, much more effectively
regulated in the developed world than the developing world. Thus, the
question of whether child labour is a "comparative advantage" of the
anges, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1998, at Al.
57. See Diller & Levy, supra note 53, at 689.
58. See id. at 664 & n.9. "A peremptory norm of international law, orjus cogens, permits no
exceptions, even for a very small number of dissenting states, and is a customary norm accepted
and recognized by the international community as a whole-that is, by a very large majority of
states." Id. at 664 n.9.
59. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, BY THE
SvEAT & TOIL OF CHILDREN: CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 4, 5 (1997). See generally
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, THE APPAREL
INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDuCT: A SOLUTION TO THE CHILD LABOR PROBLEM? (1996)
(reporting on the use of child labour in the production of apparel in the United States market and
the extent to which United States apparel importers have established and are implementing codes
of conduct prohibiting the use of child labour in the industry).

60. See Zuckoff, supranote 47.
61.

See Freeman, supranote 45.
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developing world, or in effect illegitimate "protectionism" by the developing world of their national industries, is a relevant issue.
Developing nations generally accept that the worst forms of child
labour should be abolished within -their own borders.62 Developing nations, moreover, typically have national laws making illegal the worst
forms of child labour, such as bonded labour, child prostitution, employment in particularly hazardous industries, and employment of the
very young. 63 Developing nations, however, believe that they cannot be
expected, at their stage of development, to abide by labour standards
equivalent to the developing world.64 It has often been pointed out that
laws against child labour are a relatively recent feature of the developed
world." It is claimed that it is hypocritical for developed nations to expect developing nations to abide by labour standards they did not attain
at a comparative stage of economic and social development. 66 Representatives of the developing world often claim that they lack the resources
to implement child labour standards and that the role of the developed
world should be to provide those resources. 6 The linkage of child labour
standards to world trade, by contrast, can be viewed as a form of neocolonialism intended to further impoverish the South in relation to the
North.
Many within the developed world, however, are frustrated by the
" widespread increase in some of the worst forms of child labour in the
South, despite the existence of national laws against them. They fear
that certain classes within the developing world are exploiting children
in a way that can never be overcome by the current system of "free
trade." ' Indeed, it is often noted that the globalization of the world
economy has exacerbated the child labour problem and the accompany62. See International Labour Conference, Report IV(I) on Child Labour, 87th Session (June
1999) (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http:llwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilc/ilc87/rep-iv-l.htm>
(addressing section entitled "Proposed Convention concerning the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labour") [hereinafter Proposed Convention].
63. See International Labour Conference, Report VI(2) on Child Labour, 86th Session (June
1998) (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.ilo.orglpubli/englishllOilc/lilc86/rep-vihtm>
(addressing paragraph entitled "United States" under "General observations" of "Introduction"
section) [hereinafter ILC Report VI(2)]. "Most countries already have legislation on child labourparticularly on minimum age." Id.; see also Proposed Convention, supra note 62 (addressing section entitled "Proposed Recommendation concerning the prohibition and immediate elimination of

the worst forms of child labour").
64. See Freeman, supranote 45.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ing tragic harm to millions of children in the developing world. 9
Globalization has produced markets for goods produced by child labour
which have created incentives to exploit children.70 Hence, it is argued
that it is necessary that this same system of world trade impose standards to ensure that its benefits are not produced through the exploitation of children.
It is generally admitted that developing nations cannot be held to
precisely the same child labour standards as more developed nations,
and the possibility of a gradation of standards has historically been a
part of LO minimum age conventions.7 ' However, there is no universally acceptable means for determining what degree of difference in
child labour standards between developed and developing nations is appropriate.72 Thus, the attempt of the LO to impose only relatively slight
age differentials between developed and developing nations, as exemplified by the terms of the 1973 Minimum Age Convention, generally
has not been accepted by the developing world.73 Relatively few developing nations have ratified the basic 1973 Minimum Age Convention,
apparently because they believe that the age differentials between developed and developing nations permitted by the Convention are insufficient.74 Hence, the world community currently lacks a universallyaccepted means of determining the appropriate differences in child labour standards between developed and developing nations.
This debate over linkage between trade and child labour standards
must be carefully navigated if the child labour movement is to succeed.
Activists in the developed world cannot simply impose their will on the
developing world, no matter how noble or humanitarian the cause. Activists in the developing world are keenly aware that formal linkage
could ultimately work to the disadvantage of their own societies, and
lead to trade sanctions or other punishments destructive to their own

69. See generally David Bacon, How Global Economy Promotes Child Labour (May 30,
1996) (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/2.111960530-child.html>
(discussing the rapid growth of the population of child labourers and how the child has become the
center of the global economy).

70. See id.
71. See International Labour Organization, C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (visited
Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scriptslconvde.pl?C138>, pmbl., art. 1 [hereinafter ILO
C138 Minimum Age Convention].
72. See generally id. (allowing underdeveloped nations to employ younger workers in certain sectors than their developed counterparts would be allowed to; typically, the age difference is
only one year).
73. See Bacon, supranote 69.

74. See id.
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nations] 5 Developed nations must admit that they possess a selfinterested motivation which could lead them to seek to improperly liquidate even the legitimate comparative advantage of the developing
world. Yet, the circumstances of millions of child labourers in the developing world is frequently tragic and seems to demand immediate action. The child labour movement will only succeed in helping these
children, however, if it can overcome the North-South divide.
B. Defining the Goal: Total Abolition versus PartialAbolition with
Regulation
The ILO and others active in shaping the current international
campaign against child labour have effectively fused recent public
awareness of particularly heinous forms of child labour, such as bonded
child labour and child prostitution, with their long-standing goal of
achieving the "total abolition" of child labour. This fusion has temporarily overshadowed fundamental questions regarding the ultimate goals
of the movement. However, the manner in which the movement defines
its ultimate goals, and the relationship which the movement expresses
between ultimate and interim goals, will be critical to its success.
The 1LO has been committed since its 1973 Minimum Age Convention to the "total abolition of child labour."76 The precise definition
of the evil to be abolished, "child labour," is by no means clear. No
concise defimition exists within the 110 conventions. The term "labour"
is used broadly in LO documents to refer to labour, work, or activity,
and hence is so broad as to be virtually limitless.7 7 The requirement,
sometimes noted, that the activity be economically significant, is not
much of a limitation, since most activities can be described in economic
terms and deemed economically significant. 7 The term "child" is defined in various ways in international and national law.79 ILO conven75. See Iqbal Masih and the Crusade Against Child Labour, 143 CONG. REC. H1693-96
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1997) (statement of James P. Moran of Virginia found in subsection "Trade
Sanctions" of section entitled "Mhat the United States Can Do").
76. ELO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 71, pmbl., art. 7.
77. See Proposed Convention, supranote 62, art. 4.
78. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, Child Labouris Growing in Africa, WORLD
OF
WORK,
No.
23
(Feb.
1998)
(visited
Feb.
4,
1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/235press/magazine/23/child.htm> [hereinafter ILO, Child Labour is Growing in Africa].
79. See Michele Jankanish, Targeting the Intolerable:Toward the Adoption of New International Labour Standards on Extreme Forms of Child Labour (1998) (visited Feb. 8, 1999)
<http:lwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishlchildlnewsroomlaboltarget.htm> (addressing section entitled

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss2/3

12

Smolin: Conflict and Ideology in the International Campaign Against Child
1999]

InternationalCampaignAgainst Child Labour

tions offered no fixed definition of the term until the most recent proposed Convention on the worst forms of child labour, which offers a
fixed definition of "all persons under the age of eighteen."8 Hence, it is
entirely possible to view the term "child labour" as including any economically significant activity by a person under the age of eighteen. The
difficulty with the literal, natural definition of the term "child labour" is
that it makes the goal of total abolition ludicrous. A seventeen year old
cooking a meal, setting a table, or cleaning her room is surely not an
evil which should arouse the international community, and yet would
come within the proposed abolition. Indeed, most would consider a sixteen year old employed part-time in formal paid employment to be a
good, rather than an evil. Many would consider it entirely appropriate
that a seventeen year old high school graduate be employed full-time.
Yet these could come within a literal meaning of the term "child labour."
It sometimes appears that the term "child labour" refers merely to
those activities forbidden by ILO minimum age conventions.8 The basic
1973 ILO Minimum Age Convention, C138, in fact can permit a great
deal of "child labour," in the literal sense of economic activities by minors or persons under the age of eighteen.82 Hence, the goal of "total
abolition" of child labour could refer simply to the goal of achieving
universal ratification and effective implementation of the standards of
ILO minimum age conventions. To the degree that one finds the terms
of those conventions reasonable, this may appear a reasonable and laudable goal.
The difficulty with this interpretation of the term "child labour,"
will be demonstrated by the analysis, in a later section of this article, of
ILO minimum age and child labour conventions.83 In simplistic terms,
the difficulty with relying on ILO prohibitions of child labour for a
fixed definition of child labour is that those prohibitions are specifically
designed not to remain fixed, but rather to progressively become more
prohibitive. Hence, a fifteen year old being employed full-time may be
"illegal" child labour in some times and places under the convention,

"Definition of child").
80. See Proposed Convention, supranote 62, art. 2.
81. See, e.g., ILC Report VI(2), supra note 63 (addressing paragraph entitled "United States"
under "General observations" of "Introduction" section). "The term 'child labour' refers to work
prohibited or regulated by international labour standards" Id.
82. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 71.
83. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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but not in others." The term, therefore, retains a slippery quality within
the conventions which would permit it to grow progressively toward its
literal meaning of any economic activity by a minor.
Finally, it is often stated or assumed that the term "child labour," in
connotation, refers only to exploitation or harmful child
its negative
"work. ' ' r This common sense attempt to limit the scope of the term unfortunately tends to beg the fundamental question of which child labour
or work is exploitative or harmful. This latter question tends to be answered in a wide variety of ways. It is very unsatisfying to have a fundamental right and proposed universally-binding legal standard phrased
in such an unsatisfying, subjective way.
The underlying difficulty is that the ILO has chosen to make a
neutral or even benign phrase into a term designed to evoke universal
condemnation. "All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy; All play
and no work makes Jack a mere toy," goes the familiar rhyme. The fact
that children-including teenagers-work, is not generally in itself
considered an evil. Children, like adults, have their work, whether it be
chores, school work, or paid employment. Despite the innocuous literal
meaning of the term, there is now a concerted campaign seeking to
abolish child labour as though it were an evil comparable to slavery.86
So long as the term "child labour" evokes the miserable conditions of
children employed in sweat shops during the early industrial period of
the North, or the sexual exploitation of the child prostitutes of East
Asia, or the bondage of the child carpet weavers of South Asia, the
implicit comparison to the movement to abolish slavery seems appropriate. As it becomes increasingly clear, however, that the legal meaning of the term sweeps well beyond such images to potentially include
activities considered minimally harmful or even benign, there will inevitably be a certain confusion and division of opinion."

84. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 71, art. 3(1) (providing that work
done by persons less than eighteen years of age is prohibited); see also id. art. 3(3) (providing for
exceptions to the eighteen year old rule); id. arts. 7(1), 7(2) (providing proper work conditions for
persons thirteen to fifteen years of age).
85. See, e.g., ILO, Child Labour is Growing in Africa, supra note 78 (addressing section
entitled "An overwhelmingly rural phenomenon" which explains that the ILO report notes need
for distinction between "appropriate work" and "normal family obligations" versus "work which
gives rise to exploitation and abuse").

86. See id.
87. Cf. ILC Report VI(2), supra note 63 (addressing paragraph entitled "France" under
"General observations" of "Introduction" section). The French government, in commenting on the
proposed child labour convention, that "it would be regrettable if the debate on new instruments
became bogged down on details about children in highly developed countries who work for pocket
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Thus, beneath the apparent agreement on the ultimate goal of
abolishing "child labour" lie severe tensions as to the actual, ultimate
goals of the movement. Some may hope that the world may one day
reach a point of economic development where all minors are legally
barred from formal, gainful employment, and where the degree of house
chores to which they are assigned is explicitly limited by law. It is certainly to the advantage of workers' groups that minimum age limits be
progressively raised, for such age limitations remove from the labour
market a significant number of workers who are generally willing to
work for relatively low wages. It is well known that in the United
States, employers are now heavily dependent on high school students to
take large numbers of low-paying part-time jobs in the service sector of
the economy." The progressive elimination of such forms of part-time
employment would theoretically raise the pressures on employers to
provide better compensation to those in the service sector. Moreover,
there is genuine concern that some high school students in America are
working so many hours as to interfere with their scholastic performance." Similarly, formal legal limitations on the amount of house chores
to which children can be assigned would generally serve the ideological
interests of those who seek more regulation of the family in the interest
of women's and children's rights, and who tend to perceive the traditional family as a source of exploitation of women and children. Finally,
a "total" abolition of child labour tends to appeal broadly to a modern
concept of childhood and adolescence as a special time largely free of
the cares and responsibilities of adulthood. Thus, the rhetoric and direction of the "total abolition" goal would tend to appeal to workers'
groups, particularly in the developed world, and to those whose complex of attitudes toward children, the family, and the state make them
generally supportive of high levels of state regulation of families and of
the economy.
As will be discussed below, currently there is relatively little formal dissent to the broadly stated goal of the total abolition of child labour."0 However, many who formally claim adherence to the goal use

money... while in some countries they are treated as slaves, work in arduous and dangerous work
or are delivered into prostitution." Id.
88. See Patti Bond, Signs, Signs, Everwhere Signs, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 8, 1999, at
El.
89. See Alex Kotlowitz, The Fruits of Teen Labor: Bad Grades, Profligacy and a Jaded
View of Working?, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1986, at A29.
90. But see ILC Report VI(2), supra note 63 (addressing section entitled "Form of the international instrument or instruments" which explains that Cameroon, Canadian employer's group,
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the ambiguity over the meaning of the term "child labour" for their own
ends.9 This group, although they may formally adhere to the officially
stated goal of "total abolition," in reality are arguing for a partial prohibition of child labour accompanied by regulation. 2 This group interprets "child labour" to refer only to clearly harmful and explicitly illegal
employment by children.93 They seek what they view as a reasonable
regulatory regime of child labour, which would broadly permit benign
forms of work and employment by minors, while outlawing clearly
harmful economic exploitation of children. Moreover, this group would
tend to be rather cautious in labeling child work as harmful "child labour."
Those in the "reasonable regulation" camp include employers'
groups, who possess an economic interest in the availability of minors
in the labour pool, and those who are generally suspicious of governmental economic regulation (free market advocates) and of governmental regulation within the family (social conservatives). Governments in
the developing world are also often in the "reasonable regulation" camp
because of their fear that an extensive international regime of child labour would lead to trade or economic penalties against them by the developed world, and would liquidate some of the "comparative advantage" of their lower labour costs by which they hope to compete in the
world market.
Currently, the two camps--defined here as the "total abolition" and
"reasonable regulation" camps-tend to talk past one another. Those
who officially promulgate the "total abolition" goal, such as the ILO,
are constantly trying to assure the world that all they seek are the reasonable and "flexible" regulations present in their minimum age conventions.' On the other hand, those who seek "reasonable regulation"
use the assurances of the LO to assure the world that they too seek

New Zealand, and New Zealand trade unions argue that some child labour is not harmful, and/or
oppose complete abolition of child labour).
91. See id. (addressing question seven under "Form of the international instrument or instruments" section).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., International Labour Office, Towards the Abolition on Child Labour: ILO
Policy and Its Implicationsfor ILO Technical CooperationActivities (Feb. 1993) (visited Feb. 4,
1999) <http:ll www.ilo.org/public/english/child/policy/towards.htm> (emphasizing throughout the
fundamental ILO objective of the abolition of child labour and the protection of working children)
[hereinafter Towards the Abolition on ChildLabour].
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"total abolition," by which they mean an extremely minimalist regulatory regime.'
It appears to be in the continuing interests of all, at the present
time, to fudge the issue of the "end-goal" of the child labour movement.
While the language of total abolition clearly draws more enthusiasm
from some than from others, most currently find it in their interests to
keep the meaning of their goals and terminology vague and flexible.
One can expect, however, that if the movement ever attains any real
success, then the underlying tensions regarding their end-goals will inevitably emerge. At such time, the only way to maintain the broad support necessary for further success would be to accept a definition of
"total abolition of child labour" which defines it, ultimately, as a reasonable regulatory regime. Those who hope for a more utopian end will
have to sacrifice their hopes for the good of the broader movement, or
else see the movement hopelessly divided. Thus, the campaign to abolish child labour will ultimately prove itself to be, in reality, the campaign to regulate child labour.
C. UniversalHuman Rights versus Cultural,Familial,and Personal
Autonomy
The ILO has recently adopted a declaration declaring the abolition
of child labour to be one of four fundamental rights of the workplace.96
While this declaration will be examined more fully below, it is necessary herein to analyze the difficulties of using the language of the international human rights movement to bolster the child labour abolition
campaign. While employing "human rights" rhetoric was virtually inevitable for the campaign, particularly given that the child labour issue
is treated to some degree in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"),97 the use of this language creates tensions and difficulties for
the movement.
Employing the language of international human rights suggests that
child labour is an evil, like slavery, which can and will be universally

95. See ILC Report VI(2), supra note 63 (addressing question seven of section entitled
"Content of a Convention").
96. See International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, 86th Session (June 1998)
2 (visited Feb. 13,
1999)
<http:/lwww.ilo.orglpublic/english110ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm> [hereinafter ILO Declaration on
Rights at Work].
97. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Part I: Substantive Provisions art. 32 (visited
Feb. 4, 1999) <http:lwww.unicef.orglcrclpartl.htm> [hereinafter CRC, Part I].

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

17

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 16:383

condemned and generally abolished. Employing human rights language
therefore will tend to energize those who seek broader, more abolitionist
definitions of "child labour." Although these abolitionist goals are not
practically obtainable in the foreseeable future, the embrace of such
goals by activists creates a tendency to constantly expand the claimed
jurisdiction of the movement to older ages and a broader range of activities through expansive definitions of terms like "child" and "labour."
This tendency will be illustrated below, as we find even in merely
regulatory child labour standards attempts to expand the jurisdiction and
reach of the movement.
When the child labour campaign presents itself as an ultimately
abolitionist part of the international human rights movement, it faces a
possible backlash by those concerned with their cultural, familial, or
personal autonomy. The international human rights movement perceives
itself as the conscience of the current world order, but the morality
which it seeks to impose would, if actually enforced, severely limit
cultural, familial, religious, and personal freedom. Therefore, nonWestern societies, including Muslim and Asian nations, have increasingly asserted the right to interpret "universal" human rights in terms of
their own cultural and religious norms. It has become increasingly unclear whether the morality contained in international human rights
documents is truly universal, or merely a variant of Western culture.
The attempt to enforce Western interpretations of human rights can appear, from a non-Western perspective, as a form of neo-colonialism, and
hence meet serious resistance."
One example of this resistance is the practice of some Muslim nations of subjecting their ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") to
reservations based on the Shariah, or Muslim law. 9 Since Muslims
constitute one-fifth of humanity, a perceived conflict between supposedly "universal" international human rights norms and Islam is not insignificant. The gender norms contained in CEDAW purport to affect
all aspects of life, applying in both public and private spheres. For example, Article 5(a) of CEDAW requires State Parties to take:

98. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER95-101, 192-98 (1996).
99. See RICHARDB. LLLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 220.14-.22 (2d

ed. 1990) (reservations to CEDAW based on Shariah or Muslim law by Egypt, Iraq and Libya).
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all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 100
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.
It has been noted that CEDAW "might permit States to curtail to an
undefined extent privacy and associational interests and the freedom of
opinion and expression."'' 1 Moreover, because the social and cultural
patterns subject to modification under CEDAW "may be patterned according to factors such as ethnicity or religion," state action mandated
by CEDAW could target particular ethnic or religious minorities in a
way which conflicts with "the principles forbidding discrimination on
the basis of race or religion."' Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that India conditioned its ratification of CEDAW to a reservation reiterating its policy of "non-interference in the personal affairs of
any Community without its initiative and consent."'0 3 India, as the
world's largest democracy, must non-coercively unite within its borders
a multiplicity of religious, cultural, and ethnic groups, and thus can
hardly afford to target such groups for intrusive programs of social and
cultural modification. 4
The campaign against child labour, like the broader international
human rights movement with which it is associated, is also seeking to
modify various social and cultural practices and attitudes.' 5 These cultural attitudes include the expectation that children will contribute economically to their families, the belief that children working is an appropriate preparation for adult life, and gender attitudes which affect
06
parental decisions about the education and training of boys and girls.'
The child labour movement has correctly perceived that these attitudes
can contribute significantly to child labour. The difficulty for the child
labour movement is that these cultural attitudes, along with their asso-

100. United Nations: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 19 I.L.M. 33, art. 5(a) (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW].
101. THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING INTHE UNrrED NATIONS 66 (1986).
102. Id.
103. LuLICH, supra note 99, at 220.19.
104. See id.
105. See David M. Smolin, Church, State, and InternationalHuman Rights: A Theological
Appraisal,73 NOTRE DANIEL. REV. 1515, 1532 (1998).
106. See Jonathan Silvers, Child Labourin Pakistan, 277 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 79,81-82
(Feb. 1996); WORLD VISION, THE GIRL CHILD (1998).
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ciated practices, are difficult to condemn entirely, as they are widespread, even in the developed world. For example, the concepts that
children should be economically productive and that work is an appropriate preparation for adulthood can be as innocuous as requiring a child
to work with her family in a weekly cleaning of their common home, or
as. shocking as the bonding out of a six year old to labour away from
home as a carpet weaver. Furthermore, differential gender attitudes in
the training and education of children remains pervasive even in the developed world, where it is sometimes trendy to educate girls separately
from boys as a way of building their leadership and academic skills, and
where some religious communities still educate girls separately in order
to preserve their chastity or give them an education appropriate to their
future domestic role.'1 7
The targeted attitudes therefore exist in a wide variety of forms and
degrees, and not all forms or degrees can be linked to exploitative forms
of child labour. Modifying the forms of those cultural attitudes and
practices, which actually contribute to exploitative child labour is therefore a finely nuanced, context-specific task, which in principle can only
be accomplished in local, culturally-appropriate ways. The ways and
degree to which children are expected to contribute to their families, the
best mix of formal education, paid employment, and apprenticeship to
prepare children for adulthood, and the best way to handle biologically
and culturally gender differences, are intrinsically context-orientated
decisions, and therefore any attempt to modify them should be sufficiently local to take account of the particular contexts in which they occur. Further, decisions about such matters normally would fall within
the spheres of family privacy, religious liberty, and cultural autonomy.
Hence, attempts to modify those attitudes and practices, particularly
when implemented coercively or without sensitivity to local conditions,
are likely to be met with significant resistance.
One of the ironies of the international human rights movement is
its largely undemocratic nature.' Although international human rights
norms are theoretically created and embraced by representative international processes, in fact much of the process of norm creation and attempted enforcement is dominated by a small group of activists who

107. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 691
(1994) (describing gendered curriculum at private religious schools of the Satmar Hasidim as
"designed to prepare girls for their roles as wives and mothers").
108. See Claudia Brewster, Note, Restoring Childhood: Saving the World's Children Front
Toiling in Textile Sweatshops, 16 J.L. & CoM. 191, 196 (1996).
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have created a common human rights culture and language which is
distinct from the culture and values of the nations and cultures which
they purport to represent.'o These activists understandably seek formal
legal adherence of their respective nation-states to human rights norms,
often regardless of whether those norms are actually congruent with the
norms of those nations." 0 For example, one of the leading American
casebooks on international human rights contains a discussion of
whether to continue the present "stealth" method of seeking ratification
of the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights," under
which advocates would "smuggle" the convention through the United
States Senate by hiding or misrepresenting the nature of the Convention."' The rhetoric of "universality" in the human rights movement,
combined with the actuality that the ideals and practices of every nation
on earth differ significantly from those norms, have habituated the human rights movement to seeking formal or theoretical adherence to its
supposedly "universal" norms in ways that are, in practice, quite undemocratic."' The odd relationship between human rights activists and
their host nations and cultures means that local communities are largely
unrepresented at the "international" meetings and conferences which
produce supposedly "universal" international human rights documents.
The temptation for the international human rights movement has
therefore been to announce rigid norms dogmatically, and then seek
ways to impose them upon local communities who, in actuality, were
unrepresented in the creation of those norms. The concerns which occasioned the norms are often appropriate. For example, the child labour
movement is properly concerned that some families employ girls at
home in full-time domestic work such that they are denied even basic or
elementary education."' The movement's consequent desire to intrude
into normally protected spheres of family privacy and community selfdetermination to assist these children is therefore understandable.
109. See Efrfn C6rdova, Some Reflections on the Overproduction of International Labor
Standards, 14 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 138, 142 (1993).
110. See Theodor Meron, A Report on the N.YU. Conference on Teaching International
Protection of Human Rights, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 881, 901 (1980) (statement of Peter
Berger); MARY ANN GLENDON, VHAT HAPPENED AT BEIING, FIRST THINGS 30,35 (Jan. 1996).
111. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 58-59, 65
(2d ed. 1996).
112. See Meron, supra note 110; GLENDON, supra note 110.
113. See International Labour Organization, Child Labour is Growing in Africa, WORLD OF
WORK,
No.
23
(Feb.
1998)
(visited
Feb.
4,
1999)
<http:llwww.ilo.orglpublic/english/235press/magazine/23/child.htm> (addressing the section entitled "The scope of the problem") [hereinafter ILO, Child Labouris Growing in Africa].
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Nonetheless, if the movement in so doing were to, in principle and
practice, attempt to establish a general power to intrude into sensitive
familial, cultural, and religious areas, and were in practice to do so in
highly coercive and culturally insensitive ways, a backlash against the
movement would seem inevitable.
The LO's tripartite structure, providing representation to governments, employers and workers, makes the organization somewhat more
broadly representative than is typical of most international human rights
institutions and organizations."4 The ILO also has much experience in
working cooperatively, rather than coercively, with nations and on the
local level."' However, the LO's abolitionist rhetoric and some of its
proposed or actual standards contain elements largely disconnected
from ideals and practices in many localities of the world. The challenge
for the 11O and broader child labour campaign will therefore be to
maintain a credible connection to local and national ideals and actualities and to work in truly democratic ways respectful of familial, cultural,
ethnic, and religious autonomy.
D. ChildLabour and the Credibility Crisis in the InternationalHuman
Rights Movement
The child labour movement, having cast itself as a part of the
broader international human rights movement, is subject to the credibility crisis of that movement. The credibility crisis of the international
human rights movement stems from the chasm between the comprehensive ideals and authority claimed in its legal documents and scholarly writings, and its generalized inability to enforce or implement those
ideals or exercise that authority. "The movement
presents a curious
'" 6
impotence."
practical
and
activism
legal
of
picture
The United Nations Charter and various human rights conventions
portray the nations of the world as liberal democracies guaranteeing the
full range of Western-style civil and political rights, while simultaneously promising a wide range of economic, social, and cultural rights,
and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,

114. See Anthony G. Freeman, ChildLabor's Impact on Free Trade, CONG. TESTIMONY, Oct.
22, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 14152423.

115. See id.
116. Smolin, supra note 105, at 1531. This discussion of the credibility crisis of the international human rights movement is an adaptation of a section from one of the author's prior articles.
See id. at 1531-33.
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language, political or 7other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth, or other status."
Civil and political rights theoretically guaranteed under the major
human rights documents include: the right to life, liberty, and security
of the person; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including
rights to change and manifest one's religion; freedom of opinion and
expression; rights of assembly and association; the right to marry and
found a family; the right to own property alone as well as in association;
the right to participate in genuine elections by universal and equal suffrage held by secret ballot; liberty of movement, including freedom to
choose a residence and leave one's country; various rights pertaining to
criminal procedure, including the right to be informed of the charges,
right to counsel, confrontation of witnesses, right against selfincrimination, appellate review, ban on double jeopardy, and prohibition
of ex post facto laws; privacy rights in one's family, home or correspondence."'
Economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed by the major human rights documents include: the right to compulsory and free elementary education, progressive implementation of free secondary education,
and a system of higher education open to all on a merit basis; the right
to work, including free choice of employment, just and favorable work
conditions, and protection against unemployment; the right to form or
join trade unions; and the right to rest and leisure, including periodic
paid holidays; a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of the worker and his family, including the continuous improvement of living conditions and the right to security in cases of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, or old age; and the highest
obtainable standard of physical and mental health."9
A broad outline of the above-named civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights can be found in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("Declaration"), adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1948, and hence, initially, a non-binding declaration. ° Human rights scholars have maintained that the Declaration, in

117. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter CPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ESCR].
118. See CPR, supranote 117, arts. 6,9, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 19, 21-23; UDHR, supranote 117,
arts. 3, 10-13, 16-21.
119. See ESCR, supra note 117, arts. 7-9, 11-13; UDHR, supra note 117, arts. 22-25.
120. See TItOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 30-33 (2d
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whole or part, has attained the status of binding international law.' The

two major human rights conventions are the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, with approximately 125 nations as parties,'
and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, with approximately 127 nations as parties.'3 Therefore, approximately twothirds of the nations of the world are theoretically bound by two major

conventions, and the entire community of nations is theoretically bound
by all or part of the Universal Declaration. 2"
It has been common to refer to the "three generations" of human
rights: the first generation being the civil and political rights emphasized by the West, the second being the economic and social rights emphasized by Communist and authoritarian states, and the third including
the rights of development and self-determination emphasized by the decolonized third world."z These Cold War and North-South divisions
have not manifested themselves in logical ways. One might expect

Western nations to ratify human rights conventions emphasizing civil
and political rights, Communist nations to ratify the economic and social conventions, and the de-colonized world to ratify only separate hu-

man

rights

documents

emphasizing

development

and

self-

determination. Instead, many nations (with the marked exception of the
United States) have adhered to a wide variety of agreements, regardless

of their actual political philosophy.2 6 For example, it is startling to find
North Korea, one of the most authoritarian nations in the world, listed
among the parties to both of the major conventions, and hence theoreti-

cally bound by the long list of rights given above. 2 ' China recently has

ed. 1995).
121. See id. at 32-38. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two major international conventions, the optional protocol to the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the
human rights provisions of the United Nations charter have been called the "international bill of
human rights." Id. at 28. The human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter, although
characterized as vague, played an important role in internationalizing human rights and providing
a legal foundation for their codification and implementation. Id. at 23-28; MERON, supra note 101;
LILLICH, supra note 99, at 220.19.
122. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 387, 387 (1995).
123. See id. at410.
124. See id. at 387,410; LILLICH, supra note 99.
125. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 120, at 234; see also Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration'sResponse to China's Human Rights Record: At the Half-Way Point, 3 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 1 (1995) (discussing the "Western" (First World), the "socialist" (Second
World), and the "ThirdWorld" approaches).
126. See Turack, supra note 125, at 26-28.
127. See CARTER & TRnIBLE, supra note 122, at 387, 410.
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28
signed (but not yet ratified) the two major human rights conventions,'
and is a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.129
Ironically, China immediately followed its signing of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a renewed crackdown on
pro-democracy activists" China has not found its poor human rights
record to be an impediment to signing human rights conventions, and
has even specifically promised to guarantee its children freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion which it regularly denies to
its adults.' 3' In practice, this kind of cynical or haphazard signing and
ratification of human rights conventions has been common.
The credibility crisis of the human rights movement therefore
stems from an overproduction of human rights instruments and standards, the apparent insignificance frequently accorded ratifications of
those instruments, and the inability of the movement to successfully
abolish particularly heinous human rights abuses such as genocide,
slavery, and torture. The movement has appeared willing to multiply
rhetorical successes, in terms of creation and ratification of human
rights instruments and standards, without regard to measurable successes 3in
implementation of even the most basic of human rights stan2

dards.

The international labour movement has apparently suffered to
some degree from some of the same difficulties. Thus, at least one
commentator has warned of the "excessive proliferation" of international labour standards, 33 and another has noted that "[t]he greatest
source of difficulty in the early days of the I.L.O. was.., the tendency
of some countries to accept standards for which there was little or no
basis in national law and practice."'" The child labour movement, with
roots in both the international human rights and international labour

128. See Frank Ching, U.S.-China Ties Make Headway, FARE. ECON. REV., Apr. 2, 1998, at
35.
129. See CRC, Status: The First Nearly Universally Ratified Human Rights Treaty in History,
at 2 (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.unicef.orglcrc/status.htm> (listing the declarations and
reservations made by countries upon ratification, acceptance, accession or succession) [hereinafter
CRC, Status].
130. See As China Signs Right Treaty, It Holds Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al;
Maggie Farley, China Detains Leaders of New Opposition Party Politics: Roundup Follows Top
Official's Declaration That Any Anti-Communist Group "Will Not Be Allowed to Exist", L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at AS.
131. See Farley, supra note 130.
132. See C6rdova, supra note 109, at 145.
133. See id. at 138.
134. E.A. LANDY, THEEFFEcwrNEss OFINTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION 83 (1966).
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standards movements, will therefore have to work particularly hard to
avoid suffering from the credibility crises endemic to its parent movements.
III. THE FOUR STAGES OF ILO ACTIVISM IN REGARD TO CHILD LABOUR
The ILO has been active in regard to child labour throughout its
seventy-year history. The nature of its activism, and its strategies, have,
however, undergone significant revision. In order to understand the current campaign against child labour, it is important to place it in the
context of the prior ILO strategies.
Although current ILO documents imply that the abolition of child
labour has always been a core part of the ILO mission as enunciated in
the original ILO Constitution of 1919,' and later in the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration of Principles, 3 6 in fact those documents have almost
nothing to say about the problem of child labour.3 , The only reference
to either children or child labour in the original Constitution is a statement in the preamble which refers to "the protection of children, young
persons, and women.' ' 38 As late as 1944, the foundational Declaration of
Philadelphia "concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization" neglects to mention children or child labour among
the core purposes of the organization. 9 The only reference to children
is contained in subsection I(h), which references "provision for child
welfare and maternity protection."'40 Thus, although a concern for chil-

135.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, pmbl. (1919) (visited

Jan. 29, 1999) <http:llwww.ilo.org/public/english/overview/iloconst.htm#annex> [hereinafter 1LO
CONSTITUTION].

136. See International Labour Office, Towards the Abolition on Child Labour. ILO Policy
and Its Implicationsfor ILO Technical CooperationActivities (Feb. 1993) (visited Feb, 4, 1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/child/policy/towards.htm>. The document reads:
The foundations of the [iLt's] policy on child labour are set out in the Preamble of the
Constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia and relevant international labour standards .... The fundamental objective of 1LO policy ... is the abolition of child labour.
The [IL0] set this as the goal in the very first year of its creation by adopting Conven-

tion No. 5 ....
Id.
137. See infra notes 142, 149-50, 153 and accompanying text.
138. ILO CoNSTrruiON, supra note 135.
139.

CONSTITUION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Annex (1944) (visited

Jan. 29, 1999) <http:lwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishloverview/iloconst.htm#annex>
Declaration of Philadelphia].
140. Id.
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dren is evident in the foundational documents of the ILO, the term
"child labour" and the goal of abolishing it are not explicitly stated.
The following four stages of ILO activism on child labour are
hopefully useful ways of understanding the development of the contemporary child labour movement."'
A. Stage One: 1919-1932: Area-Specific Age Limitations
Despite the absence of a significant focus on children or child labour in the 1LO's foundation documents, the LO, within its first year,
created its initial convention on child labour.' 2 These early 1LO conventions, however, lack the term "child labour" or any reference to the
abolition of child labour as a goal or slogan.'43 Instead, the LO approach was to divide employment into four different areas or types, and
create separate conventions limiting the ages at which children could be
employed in each area."
The first convention, adopted in 1919, was the Minimum Age
(Industry) Convention.'45 This Convention set fourteen as the minimum
age for employment in industry, but included exceptions for "an undertaking in which only members of the same family are employed."' 416 The
Convention included a fairly comprehensive, yet specific, definition of
industrial employment. Japan and India were specifically granted less
stringent age limitations. 8 The 1LO followed with the 1920 Minimum
Age (Sea) Convention, setting fourteen as the minimum age for employment on vessels, "other than49 vessels upon which only members of
the same family are employed."'

141. This Article's review of ILO child labour standards will concentrate on ILO Conventions
and, in the interest of space, will generally bypass discussion of the accompanying, but nonbinding, recommendations. See ABDUL-KARIM TmRI, TRIPARTISM AND THE INTERNAIONAL
LABouR ORGANIZATION 254 (1982) (explaining differences between conventions and recommendations).
142. See International Labour Organization, C5 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919
(visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.plC5> [hereinafter ILO C5
(Industry) Convention].
143. See id.
144. See id. art. 1.
145. ILO C5 (Industry) Convention, supranote 142.
146. IL art. 2.
147. See id. art. 1.
148. See id. arts. 5-6.
149. International Labour Organization, C7 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920, art. 2
(visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http:lilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C7> [hereinafter ILO C7 (Sea)
Convention].
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In 1921, the ILO adopted the Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, which established fourteen as the minimum age for children to
be employed in agricultural undertakings during the school day.'50 This
more lenient rule did not restrict the use of children in agriculture
"outside the hours fixed for school attendance," except to insist that this
employment not "prejudice their attendance at school."'' Thus, the restrictions on agricultural employment were much less stringent than
those in industrial and sea employment, and essentially lacked any
minimum age for work performed outside of school hours.' Finally, in
1921, the ILO also created a convention forbidding "young persons under the age of eighteen" from being employed on vessels as trimmers or
stokers,'53 with allowance for a younger minimum age for Japan and
India.'"
These early conventions therefore limited themselves to trying to
establish fourteen as the minimum age for employment in industry or at
sea, and with ensuring that child agricultural workers under fourteen
had the opportunity to go to school. 55 The terminology of those under
eighteen as "young persons" rather than "children" suggests uncertainty
as to whether older teenagers could properly be labeled "children." The
provision of lower minimum ages for India and Japan suggested some
willingness to accommodate cultural and economic conditions in the
non-Western world. Exceptions for same-family employment indicated
a respect for the principle of family autonomy, or at least a recognition
that it was not practicable to regulate employment within a family business.
After three straight years of creating minimum age conventions,
the ILO waited another eleven years before creating its next convention,
the 1932 Minimum Age Convention on Non-Industrial Employment.'
150. See International Labour Organization, C10 Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention,
1921, art. 1 (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/Convde.pl?C1O> [hereinafter
ILO CIO (Agriculture) Convention].
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. International Labour Organization, C15 (Shelved) Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers)
Convention,
1921,
art.
2
(visited
Feb,
3,
1999)
<http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/Convde.pl?C15> [hereinafter ILO C15 (Trimmers and Stokers)
Convention].
154. See id. art. 3(c).
155. See ILO C5 (Industry) Convention, supra note 142, art. 2; ILO C7 (Sea) Convention,
supra note 149, art. 2; LO C10 (Agriculture) Convention, supranote 150, pmbl., arts. 1, 2.
156. International Labour Organization, C33 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment)
Convention, 1932 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl7C33>
[hereinafter ILO C33 (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention].
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This Convention constituted an important step, for it defined "nonindustrial" employment as all employment not covered by the prior
three area conventions (industry, agriculture, and sea employment), and
thus for the first time created a comprehensive regulatory regime for
minimum age."7 From this time on, every form of employment would
have an applicable minimum age convention.'58
The very comprehensiveness of this catch-all Convention necessitated a more complex framework. First, the Convention included the exception, used previously, for establishments "in which only members of
' but for the first time limited the
the employer's family are employed," 59
exception where such employment was harmful to the health or normal
development of children, dangerous to their life, health or morals, or
prejudiced their attendance or performance at school.' 6 Second, the
Convention excepted "domestic work in the family performed by members of that family."'' 6' The very necessity of a "domestic work" exception acknowledged the breadth of the Convention, for it implied that
normal domestic tasks undertaken within a family, such as kitchen
work, cleaning, and child care, would be subject to the Convention were
it not for the exception. Requiring a ten year old to set the table or clean
his room would apparently be considered a forbidden form of "nonindustrial employment," but for the domestic work exception.
The basic minimum age prohibition in the Non-Industrial Employment Convention was relatively complex, and, in many respects,
more of a regulation than a prohibition. First, the minimum age given
was fourteen, except that the age could be higher where the children
were still required to attend primary school. 6 2 Children over twelve,
however, were permitted to be employed on "light work" outside of
school hours.'63 The extensive definition of "light work" included a
limitation of two hours per day in countries with compulsory school attendance, and four-and-one-half hours otherwise, and a prohibition of
such work on Sundays and legal public holidays.' 6 The requirement of
Sunday as a day of rest appears to indicate a presumption that the
Christian Sabbath should be the national day of rest; the only country
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. art. 1(1).
See id.
Id. art. 1(3)(a).
See id. arts. 2,3,5.
ILO C33 (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention, supranote 156, art. 1(3)(b).
See id. art 2.
See id. art. 3(1).
See id. arts. 3(1)(c), 3(2)(a), 3(4)(b).
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exempted from this requirement was India, and this exemption was a
part of a broader exemption for India, which would expire once India
adopted compulsory education to age fourteen. 65
The Convention further required national parties to fix higher
minimum ages for employment "dangerous to the life, health or morals
of the persons employed in it" and for "itinerant trading in the streets,"
employment in "stalls outside shops," and other "itinerant occupations."' Consistent with prior conventions, those subject to these restrictions, who would be over fourteen, were referred to as "young persons and adolescents" rather than as "children."' 67
Finally, the Non-Industrial Employment Convention included an
exception permitting children to be employed in public entertainment or
movies, and provided some minimal regulation of such employment. 61
While it would be a few more years before Shirley Temple would become world-famous, the use of children in public entertainment and
movies was already well-established, and the Convention broadly protected such employment.
The relatively complex provisions of the Non-Industrial Convention thus permitted thirteen year olds to be engaged in "light work,"
created a general minimum age of fourteen for employment beyond
light work, required authorities to create higher minimum ages for more
hazardous forms of employment, and provided exceptions for samefamily enterprises, domestic work by members of the family, and child
performers.6 9 Combined with the prior three area-specific Minimum
Age Conventions, the 1932 Non-Industrial Convention created a fairly
comprehensive regimen. Like other international conventions, however,
these minimum age conventions were only applicable to those nations
which ratified them. 7 '
B. Stage Two: RaisingMinimum Ages, 1936 to 1965
The second stage of ILO activism on child labour consisted primarily of the creation of revised versions of three of the four original
subject area Minimum Age Conventions. Thus, the Revised Versions of
165. See id. arts. 9(1), 9(2).
166.

ILO C33 (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention, supranote 156, art. 6.

167. Id. arts. 5, 6.
168. See id. art. 4.
169. The Convention also permitted work done in "technical and professional schools" of an
"educative character" and "not intended for commercial profit." Id. art. 1(2)(b).
170. See id. art. 11(1).
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the Minimum Age Sea (1936), Industry (1937), and Non-Industrial
Employment (1937) Conventions raised the primary minimum age from
fourteen to fifteen. 17' The Revised Non-Industrial Convention also raised
the minimum age for light work from thirteen to fourteen.' No revision
to the Agriculture Convention was created. The term "children" now
was used in a way to include those under fifteen, or still within compulsory education laws, while the term "young persons or adolescents" was
7 3 Thus, the
also used for those beyond the basic minimum age limit.Y
second stage of ILO activism retained the regulatory framework created
in stage one, while attempting to raise the minimum ages.
Twenty-two years later, the ILO created a Minimum Age Convention for Fishermen (1959), 74 and then six years later, a Minimum Age
Convention for Underground Work (1965).7T These new regulatory re-

gimes were apparently intended to raise minimum ages for particular
kinds of hazardous employment.
C. Stage Three: A GeneralInstrument on Minimum Age

The 1973 Minimum Age Convention ("C138") represents a significant change in the ILO approach to child labour.'76 Rather than try-

171. See International Labour Organization, C58 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised),
1936, art. 2 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http:lilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/Convde.pl?C58> (stating that
"[c]hildren under the age of fifteen years shall not be employed or work on vessels . .. ")
[hereinafter ILO C58 (Sea) Convention (Revised)]; see also International Labour Organization,
C59 Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1937, art. 2 (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scriptslConvde.pl?C59> (stating that "[c]hildren under the age of fifteen
years shall not be employed or work in any public or private industrial undertaking .... )
[hereinafter ILO C59 (Industry) Convention (Revised)]; International Labour Organization, C60
(Shelved) Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), 1937, art. 2 (visited
Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C60> (stating that "[c]hildren under fifteen years of age.., shall not be employed in any employment .... ) [hereinafter ILO C60 (NonIndustrial Employment) Convention (Revised)].
172. See C60 Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) (Revised), supra note 171, art. 3.
173. See id. arts. 2, 5, 6.
174. See International Labour Organization, C112 Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention,
1959 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.eh:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C1l2> [hereinafter ILO
C112 (Fishermen) Convention].
175. See International Labour Organization, C123 Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, 1965 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http:lilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/Convde.pl?C123>
[hereinafter ILO C123 (Underground Work) Convention].
176. See International Labour Organization, C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (visited
Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scriptslconvde.pl?C138>, pmbl. [hereinafter ILO C138
Minimum Age Convention].
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ing to cover the field with a group of area-specific conventions, the ILO
created a general instrument designed, according to the preamble, to
"gradually replace the existing ones applicable to limited economic
sectors."'77 In addition, the preamble specifically
stated the goal of
"achieving the total abolition of child labour."'78
Article One of the new Minimum Age Convention requires each
State Party to "pursue a national policy designed to ensure the effective
abolition of child labour and to raise, progressively, the minimum age
for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons.' 79 Thus, C138
commits State Parties to both an ultimate goal-the "total abolition of
child labour"--and also to a progressive implementation of that goal
through periodic raising of the minimum ages for employment.'80
The endpoint of this goal, the effective abolition of child labour, is
never specifically defined in the Convention.'8 ' The term "labour" is apparently intended to be broadly interpreted to include any "employment
or work."' 82 The term "child" is never defined.' Interpreted literally, the
"total abolition of child labour" could include a prohibition on any economically significant activity performed by a person not yet an adult,
regardless of whether paid or unpaid, or whether performed within or
without the family. An American seventeen year old cleaning his own
room, for example, could be literally subsumed under the term "child
labour," since cleaning is certainly work which is economically significant, and a seventeen year old is still legally a minor. The difficulty with
this literal definition is, of course, that it overreaches to the point of absurdity.
Alternatively, the term "child labour" could refer to activities specifically prohibited by the Convention. From this perspective, employment by children fifteen or older, or light work within the terms of the
Convention, would not be "child labour," and hence, not subject to the
goal of "effective abolition" of child labour, because they are permitted
within the minimum standardsof the Convention. This more reasonable
construction, however, is made problematic by the specific intent of the
Convention to require State Parties to engage in a progressive raising of
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 1.
See id. pmbl., art. 1.
See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention (1973), supra note 176.
Id. arts. 2(1), 3(1) (prohibiting various kinds of "employment or work").
See id. pmbl., art.1.
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the minimum ages, with no final "endpoint" defined specifically in
terms of ages." Therefore, work by minors, which is not explicitly
prohibited by the Minimum Age Convention, nonetheless can become
prohibited "child labour" as State Parties abide by their undertaking to
progressively raise their minimum age standards."' Although the Convention, for example, only requires (for developed nations) a minimum
age for full-time employment of fifteen, nonetheless the Convention
creates a mechanism for raising that minimum age as a part of its
commitments under the Convention.' 6 Therefore, if a nation raises its
minimum age to eighteen, in fulfillment of its undertaking of progressive implementation, then full-time employment at age seventeen within
that nation would, under the terms of the Convention, be deemed prohibited "child labour." Similarly, matters such as domestic work within
a family are not explicitly excepted from the definition of child labour,
but instead are apparently left to national law, raising the possibility that
they might, in certain circumstances, come within the definition of prohibited "child labour." Thus, since the ultimate definition of prohibited
"child labour" is specifically left open to expansion by the terms of the
Convention, it seems impossible to deduce any fixed definition of the
final goal of total abolition of "child labour" from within the Convention itself.
It would still be possible to argue that for purposes of the goal of
the "total" and "effective" "abolition of child labour," the term "child
labour" only refers to that which violates the minimum standardsof the
Convention. However, this interpretation of the term "child labour"
seems to defy the language requiring governments to "pursue a national
policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and to
raise, progressively, the minimum age standards for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and
mental development of young people."' ' This language suggests that
the goal of complete abolition is not satisfied until the minimum age is
raised to the point maximizing the development of "young persons."
What this point is, and indeed who "young persons" are, is also not defined.'88 Hence, it seems best to conclude that the definition of "child labour," and the ultimate goal of the Convention, is left deliberately open

184.

See id. arts. 1, 2(2).

185. See id.
186. See id. arts. 2(2), (3).
187. Id. art. 1.
188. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supranote 176.
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so as to make the instrument a continuing force for the progressive
raising of the minimum age.'89
The intent of the Convention to replace all of the varied area specific Conventions requires a rather complex set of minimum age standards. The basic age standard given requires that the "minimum age for
admission to employment or work" must be not less than "the age of
completion of compulsory schooling," and in any case "not less than 15
years."'' The Convention immediately provides for slightly greater
flexibility for developing nations by declaring that Parties "whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed" may choose
fourteen, rather than fifteen, as the age of minimum employment.' 9' At
the same time, the Convention allows State Parties to choose a minimum age above that of the Convention's minimum standards, and specifically provides that State Parties may, by subsequent declarations,
progressively raise their minimum ages."'
The Convention ameliorates its age limitations by providing that
Parties may permit persons thirteen to fifteen years of age to perform
light work, defined as work "not likely to be harmful to... health or
development" which does not interfere with school.' 93 National authorities are to determine the regulations, such as maximum hour limitations,
applicable to "light work."'94 Developing nations who avail themselves
of the provision allowing them to choose fourteen as the minimum age
of employment, may permit light work by those twelve to fourteen. '95
The ILO in prior conventions had sometimes specified particular
areas of employment which, because of their hazardous nature, required
higher minimum age standards.'96 C138 subsumes all of these into a
catch-all provision, requiring a minimum standard of age eighteen for
employment "likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young
persons."' 97 National authorities are required to determine the types of

189. See International Labour Office Press Release, Child Labour: Action Required at the
NationalLevel (June 1996) ("the ultimate objective... is the total and effective abolition of any
kind of work, employment or activity likely to prejudice the child's dignity, safety, health or education" (quoting Child Labour: What is to be done? Documentfor discussion at the Infonnal Tripartite Meeting at the MinisterialLevel, International Labour Office (June 1996))).
190. Id. art. 2(3).
191. Id. art. 2(4).
192. See id. arts. 2(2), 2(3).
193. Id. arts. 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b).
194. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 176, art. 7(3).
195. See id. art. 7(4).
196. See, e.g., ILO C123 (Underground Work) Convention, supra note 175, pmbl.
197. ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 176, art. 3(1).
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employment to be so considered.'98 The C138 permits sixteen year olds
to be employed in such hazardous employment where it was determined
that their "health, safety and morals" could be "fully protected" and
adequate training was provided. 19
In prior conventions, the ILO had provided broad exemptions for
same-family enterprises, domestic work performed by members of a
family, and agricultural work performed outside of school hours.'
Rather than listing any of these exclusions, Article Four of C138 permits State Parties to "exclude from the application of this Convention
limited categories of employment or work in respect of which special
and substantial problems of application arise."'" Work considered dangerous to the "health, safety or morals of young persons," for which a
higher minimum age should apply, was not to be subject to such exception. 2 One result of this approach to exceptions was to somewhat delegitimize the prior exceptions, for they now depended on specific actions by each individual State Party. Moreover, the reason given for
such exception was now related to "problems of application," rather
than, for example, a principled position that certain kinds of child labour
were positive rather than negative, or were in the sphere
of the family,
3
2
regulation.
labour
to
subject
be
not
should
and hence,
Article Five of the Convention allows for additional limitations or
exceptions to the Convention based on the insufficient development of
some nations' "economy and administrative facilities."' This provision
apparently was intended as a replacement for the prior tendency to name
particular developing nations, such as India, for lesser standards. Article
Five, however, specifically named economic areas where the Convention, as a minimum, must apply.2 5 These included "mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; electricity, gas and water; sanitary
services; transport, storage and communication; and plantations and
other agricultural undertakings mainly producing for commercial purposes, but excluding family and small-scale holdings producing for lo-

198.
199.
200.
art. 3.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See id. art. 3(2).
Id. art. 3(3).
See, e.g., ILO C60 (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), supra note 171,
ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 176, art. 4(1).
Id. art. 3(3).
See id. art. 4(1).
Id. art. 5(l).
See id. art. 5(3).
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cal consumption and not regularly employing hired workers." 2°6 The inclusion of most forms of agriculture here indicated a significant expansion of regulation from the 1921 Agricultural Convention, which had
broadly permitted employment not interfering with school.2 O Many
smaller agricultural undertakings involve cash or export crops and some
employment of hired workers, and therefore would fall within the mandatory coverage of the Convention.2°s
C138 retained the prior exceptions for public performances and for
work related to education (such as vocational education), although some
of the terminology was altered. 2°9 These provisions required significant
regulatory involvement (such as individual permitting), presumably to
avoid abuse.1 0
The complex and comprehensive regulatory regime created by
C138 has yet to be accepted by most members of the ILO. 2 ' By 1996,
only forty-nine of ILO's 173 Member Nations had ratified C138, and
none of the countries of Asia, where a high proportion of child labourers
live, had ratified the instrument.2 2 Thus, although the ILO currently
considers C138 to be among its seven "core" Conventions, the instrument by the early 1990's appeared to have failed to achieve its purposes.1 2 With the globalization of the economy and the increase in
world trade bringing the issue of child labour increasingly to public attention, the ILO decided to alter its strategy. 14

206. ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 176, art. 5.
207. See International Labour Organization, CIO Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention,
1921, art. 1 (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http:lilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.plClO> [hereinafter
ILO CIO (Agriculture) Convention].
208. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 176, art. 5(3).
209. See id. arts. 6, 8.
210. See id.
211. See International Labour Organization Press Release, InternationalAction: Standards
Need
Reinforcing
(June
1996)
(visited
Feb.
3,
1999)
<http:llwww.ilo.orglpublilc/english/235press/pkits/Child3.htm> [hereinafter ILO Press Release,
InternationalAction: StandardsNeed Reinforcing].
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. The ILO proposed increased technical cooperation between the ILO and its
member States in order to bring national laws and practices more in line with international labour
standards.
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D. CurrentILO Strategies

1. Child Labour as a Core ILO Mission
During the 1990's, the ILO has pushed the campaign to abolish
child labour to the center of its mission.2 5 The new activism of the ILO
on the issue of child labour represents an ambitious attempt to abolish a
practice involving literally hundreds of millions of people, a practice
supported not only by tradition but also a facet of the emerging globalism of the world market.
The humanitarian purposes of the ILO in targeting child labour are
apparent, but the campaign also is a strategic part of a broader purpose
and ideology. The campaign to eliminate child labour has become the
poster child of the broader ILO purpose of promoting16 "social justice"
within the progressively integrated world trade system.1
In 1992, the ILO created the International Programme on the
Elimination of Child Labour ("IPEC"), which provides technical assistance to countries who enter into Memorandum of Understandings
("MOU") with the ILO.217 The ILO has succeeded both in obtaining
significant funding for IPEC from developed nations, and in entering
into memoranda of understandings with many of the developing nations
with the largest numbers of child labourers."' Thus, the ILO has entered
into MOU's with nations in critical regions such as South Asia (India,
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Thailand), Latin
America (Brazil), and Africa (Kenya)." IPEC is therefore active in assisting nations in producing plans and programs to combat child labour
in many of the most affected countries of the developing world.'
The ILO, however, has not been content to combat child labour
through its program of cooperative technical assistance."' Instead, it has
215. See id.
216. See ILO Press Release, InternationalAction: StandardsNeed Reinforcing, supra note
211.
217. See id. (addressing section entitled "Childhood: a fundamental human right").
218. See id. (addressing section entitled "Expanding technical cooperation").
219. See id. (addressing section entitled "Childhood: a fundamental human right").
220. See International Labour Organization, InternationalProgramme on the Elimination of
Child Labour (JPEC) (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http:lwww.ilo.orglpublic/english190ipec/publlhigh98/partl.htm> [hereinafter ILO, InternationalProgrammeon the Elimination of Child Labour]. A
thorough analysis of ILO's IPEC programs is beyond the scope of this article.
221. See generally id. (discussing the ILO's commitment to the Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the likely adoption of a new ILO Convention on action against the
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worked, particularly since 1996, to place the abolition of child labour at
the core of ILO purposes, and to define new standards and strategies to
eliminate at least the most extreme forms of child labour.' In the process, the ILO appears to be attempting to circumvent the failure of most
nations to adhere to their general 1973 Minimum Age Convention.
Thus, at the closing plenary session of the 86 'h Annual International
Labour Conference, held during June of 1998, the ILO adopted an "ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work." 2 3 The purpose of this declaration, as explained within the document, is to promote
social justice, development, and progress within the context of trade liberalization and a globalizing economy.2 The Declaration states that all
ILO members (174 nations) in joining the organization have thereby
"endorsed the principles and rights" in the ILO Constitution and the
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, and also have "undertaken to work
towards attaining the overall objectives of the Organization ....
These ILO "principles and rights," according to the 1998 Declaration,
"have been expressed and developed in the form of specific rights and
obligations in Conventions recognized as fundamental both inside and
outside the Organization." 6 Therefore, all ILO members, "even if they
have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising
from the very fact of [ILO] membership.., to respect, to promote and
to realize... the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are
the subject of those Conventions ...... ,' The seven core conventions
include C 138 and the 1973 Minimum Age Convention. Moreover, the
seven core conventions are understood to include four fundamental
rights, including "the effective abolition of child labour."

worst forms of child labour in June of 1999, and the development and implementation of country
programs to eliminate child labour).
222. See id.
223. International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at
Work,
86th
Session
(June
1998)
2
(visited
Feb.
13,
1999)
<http://www.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm> [hereinafter ILO Declaration on
Rights at Work].
224. See id. pmbl. The Director-General of the ILO, Michael Hansenne, praised the adoption
of the Declaration as a "watershed point in the struggle to achieve social justice in the globalizing
economy." International Labour Organization Press Release, Fundamental Rights Declaration
ClearsFinalHurdle; ILO Conference Seeks End to Child LabourAbuses (June 18, 1998) (visited
Feb. 2, 1999) <http:lwww.ilo.orglpublic/english/235press/pr/1998/28.htm> [hereinafter ILO Press
Release, FundamentalRights DeclarationClearsFinalHurdle].
225. ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 223, at l(a).
226. Id. at l(b).
227. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 2(c). The other three fundamental rights are: "freedom of association and the ef-
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Thus, the Declaration appears to commit all 174 ILO nationswhich include the vast majority of nations of the world-to the abolition
of child labour, despite the fact that only a minority of such nations
have ratified the 1973 Minimum Age Convention which first established this as an official goal. Thus far, the ILO's campaign to increase
ratifications of their "seven core conventions" has increased ratifications of the Minimum Age Convention from forty-nine ratifications in
1996 to sixty-three in June 1998, which suggests that the goal of general
ratification of the 1973 Convention is not in immediate view.29 The
continuing failure to achieve general ratification of the Minimum Age
Convention underscores the potential significance of the Declaration on
the subject of child labour.
The 1998 Declaration creates a paradoxical situation in regard to
ILO members and the goal of abolishing child labour. It is a general
principle, stated in 1LO Conventions, that the Conventions only bind
those nations which ratify them."o Yet the Declaration appears to state
that the mere fact of 1LO membership, in effect, commits all nations to
the principles and rights of the 1973 Convention on Minimum Age,
though not to the detailed regulatory regime of that Convention. The
central "principle and right" in the Minimum Age Convention is that of
effectively abolishing child labour. " It is by no means easy, however,
to define this goal, particularly outside the context of the specific regulations of the Minimum Age Convention.
The controversial question of whether the 1998 Declaration creates
new obligations has been obscured, rather than clarified, by the rhetoric
of the Declaration, and of the ILO Director-General. This rhetoric
claims, in effect, that everything in the Declaration exists, at least in
implicit form, in the 1LO Constitution and the 1944 Declaration of
Philadelphia, and therefore that the Declaration is doing no more than
making more explicit the principles and rights implicit in 1LO membership, and applying them to the current context of "growing economic
fective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." Id. at 2.
229. See Michele Jankanish, Targeting the Intolerable:Toward the Adoption of New International Labour Standards on Extreme Forms of Child Labour, at 15 (1998) (visited Feb. 8, 1999)
<http:llwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishlchildlnewsroomlaboltarget.htm>; ILO Press Release, FundamentalRights DeclarationClearsFinal Hurdle, supranote 224, at 2.
230. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973
(visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http:/Iilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C138>, art. 12(1) [hereinafter
ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention].
23 1. See id. pmbl.
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interdependence." In regard to child labour, this claim attempts to
ground the "effective abolition of child labour" in brief statements in the
ILO Convention and the Declaration of Philadelphia regarding the welfare and protection of children. It is true, of course, that the abolition of
child labour is seen, by its promoters, as a means of protecting children.
It is not true, however, that everyone who seeks to protect children, and
to promote child welfare, thereby necessarily agrees that abolishing
child labour is a necessary means to that end. Therefore, it is simply
wrong to say that all ILO members, in being committed to the protection and welfare of children, must necessarily be committed to the abolition of child labour.
Of course, if the term "child labour" included only the most exploitative forms of child labour, such as bonded labour, child prostitution, and hazardous work, then it would be easier to argue that there is a
self-evident link between prior commitments to child welfare, and new
declarations on the abolition of child labour. The term "child labour,"
however, in the 1973 Minimum Age Convention is a much broader term
which could easily encompass work or activity which many ILO members might consider harmless, or even beneficial, to children and their
families. Indeed, the ambiguity of the term "child labour" within the
Minimum Age Convention and the Fundamental Principles Declaration
make it unclear precisely the extent of the supposed commitment of all
1LO members to work for child labour's "effective abolition."
The Declaration consolidates recent 1LO efforts to push the child
labour issue from the periphery to the core of its mission. 2 Invoking the
abolition of child labour as one of only four named fundamental human
rights at work is a significant change of focus from the 1LO Constitution
and 1944 Philadelphia Conventions, where the term "child labour" was
non-existent, and where the protection of children was mentioned but
not emphasized. As late as 1996, an 1LO brochure summarized the
"basic human rights" protected by ILO Conventions without mentioning
the abolition of child labour. 3

232. See ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supranote223, at 2(c).
233. See International Labour Organization, InternationalLabour Organization: Bureau for
Workers'
Activities
(brochure)
(visited
Feb.
8,
1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/230actra/child/proj/actrbroc.htm> (discussing that ILO conventions cover basic human rights including "freedom of association, the right to organize and
bargain collectively, the abolition of forced labour, and the elimination of discrimination"). This
brochure included the "employment of children" as an issue addressed by ILO conventions, but
excluded the issue from its listing of "basic human rights." See id.
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The difficulties facing this shift of focus to child labour is exemplified by the fact that the 1973 Minimum Age Convention is by a wide
margin the least ratified of the seven "core" conventions.2 As of June
1998, the other six core conventions had ratification rates between seventy percent and eighty-four percent of ILO members, while only thirtysix percent of ILO members had ratified the Minimum Age Convention.25 The apparent intent of the Declaration to define adherence to the
1973 Convention as a question of fundamental human right, therefore
faces significant resistance from ILO member states.
This resistance is generally implicit, rather than explicit, due in
large part to the ambiguity of the term "child labour." The possible
meanings of the phrase "child labour" have been examined in detail
above.26 The term is elastic enough to encompass abolitionists who
hope for the progressive raising of minimum age standards virtually
until the age of majority, minimalists who would argue that child labour
has been "abolished" when employment by minors is subject to minimal
regulation, and all those in-between. These ambiguities apparently persist because they serve multiple interests and keep the movement intact.
Employers and developing nations apparently feel relatively little need
to vigorously dissent from the formal statement of the goal of abolition,
because they believe they retain the right to define the goal of
"abolition" in terms of a regulatory regime largely of their own choosing.
The failure of employers' groups and developing nations to vigorously resist the ILO elevation of "effective abolition of child labour" to
a universal fundamental right should not lull anyone into believing that
there is no resistance to the enforcement of vigorous standards against
child labour. The international human rights movement in recent years
has continuously multiplied the list of supposedly fundamental human
rights, and the world has become awash in an ever-growing tide of international human rights conventions, declarations, and pronouncements.27 Developing nations and multi-national corporations are quite
familiar with the rhetorical excesses of the human rights movement, and
with the failure of the world to achieve effective implementation or en-

234. See ILO Press Release, FundamentalRights Declaration Clears Final Hurdle, supra
note 224, at 2.
235. See id.
236. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
237. See generally ILO PressRelease, FundamentalRights DeclarationClears Final Hurdle,
supra note 224 (giving a summary of such conventions, declarations and proclamations).
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forcement of the ever-growing list of "rights."" s It would be difficult
even for a heart-felt advocate of the international human rights movement not to grow somewhat cynical at the gap between rhetoric and
reality in the field of human rights. Hence, it may be that some actors in
the international community no longer consider it important to actively
resist human rights pronouncements with which they disagree, particularly when those pronouncements are left ambiguous enough to be made
harmless through interpretation.
It is therefore not surprising that some of the fiercest debate on the
ILO Fundamental Rights Declaration occurred on matters touching on
its implementation."' The most important issues, it appeared, were not
the substantive definition of human rights, but rather the question of
whether there would be any effective enforcement of those rights.240
Thus, the tension between developed and developing nations was
revealed by the fierce debate at the 1998 0L Conference on language
in the Fundamental Principles Declaration which would pertain to a
possible linkage between labour standards and trade, or between labour
standards and international financial assistance. 4' As noted above, developing nations are extremely sensitive to any possible linkage between the 1LO and the WTO, the IMF or World Bank. 42 This concern
emerged in regard to paragraph three of the Declaration, which in its final form recognized an obligation of the LO to encourage other international organizations "with which the 1LO has established relations" to
support the efforts of member nations to attain 1LO objectives."' This

238. See generally id. (discussing the seven conventions, a variety of workplace rights and
the failure to achieve universal ratification of any of those conventions).
239. See generally Jankanish, supra note 229 (discussing the proposed new international
standards on child labour and how they will be implemented); see also ILO Press Release, Fundamental Rights Declaration Clears Final Hurdle, supra note 224 (addressing section entitled
"Discussions on the worst forms of child labour").
240. See Jankanish, supra note 229, at 12-15.
241. See generally International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles (Committee Report), 86th Session (June 1998) (visited Feb 1, 1999)
<http;llwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOicflc86/com-decl.htm> [hereinafter ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Committee Report)]. The purpose of the Convention was "to answer the basic
question of whether the Conference could achieve a meaningful Declaration and effective followup .... Id. 7. Of particular importance and concern was the follow-up mechanism. Without
effective follow-up procedures, any Declaration would carry little weight. However, members fear
that organizations other than the ILO will be used to enforce labour standards through economic
and trade pressures. See id. U 10, 13, 19, 21.
242. See id.
243. See ILO,Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 223, 1 3.
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final formulation did not satisfy all of the developing nations.24 Some
assurance was provided by the controversial paragraph five, which
[s]tresses that labour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that nothing in this Declaration and
its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any country
should in no way
245 be called into question by this Declaration and
its follow-up.
Egypt, for example, was not satisfied with the assurances found in
paragraph five, and would have preferred language "more specific and
categorical in denying the use of this Declaration and its follow-up
mechanism to justify or in any way assist in the adoption of trade or
economic measures or restrictive or punitive measures of any kind
which negatively affect the process of economic and social development. '2 46 Thus, the developing nations sought strong assurances that
they could not be economically punished in any way for alleged failures
to implement ILO standards or fundamental rights.
By contrast, the position of the United States, while also opposing
"protectionism," was to seek "an accelerated collaboration between the
ILO and WTO." ' 7 Further, the United States viewed the denial of workers' fundamental rights as itself a form of protectionism. 248 Thus, the
United States emphasized that neither paragraph five of the Declaration,
the ILO, or the WTO, could impinge "on the ability of the United States
to condition the extension of trade benefits on labour standards." 249
The economic tensions underneath these conflicts are delineated in
detail above. Much of the "comparative advantage" of the developing
world lies in its lower labour costs. From the perspective of some in the
developed world, however, some of these lower labour costs are an un244. See generally ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Committee Report), supra note
241 (discussing throughout the developing nations' dissatisfaction with paragraph three of the
Declaration and their desire to reaffirm the sole competence of the ILO in setting and dealing with
international labour standards).
245. ILO,Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 223, 1 5.
246. International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles (Discussion in Plenary), 86th Session (June 1998) (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http:llwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilcilc86/com-decl.htm> (statement of Mr. Elamawy,
Egypt's Minister of Manpower and Emigration) [hereinafter ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Discussion in Plenary)].
247. Id. (statement of Mr. Samet, United States Government Delegate).
248. See id.
249. ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Committee Report), supra note 241, 378.
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fair competitive advantage caused by the failure of the developing world
to honor basic labour standards and fundamental workers' rights.20 This
issue is quite germane to the issue of child labour, for child labour significantly reduces labour costs. To the degree that lower labour costs in
the developing world reflect violations of international labour standards
and fundamental workers' rights, some in the developed world consider
those lower costs as an illegitimate advantage, and hence as a form of
"protectionism.""
Developing nations, by contrast, believe that it is hypocritical for
developed nations to expect developing nations to abide by labour standards they did not attain at a comparative stage of economic and social
development. 2 The developing world often claims that it lacks the resources to implement child labour standards, and that the role of the developed world should be to provide a significant share of those resources. 3 The developing world fears that the developed world will
attempt to use labour standards to nullify the comparative advantage of
the developing world, and to further enrich itself at the expense of the
developing world.- From this point of view, labour standards evoke the
memories of colonialism, when the wealth of the Southern developing
world was exploited for the benefit of the rich nations of the North.
This underlying economic tension was also evident in the debate
over the "follow-up" to the Declaration, contained in an Annex, which
provided several new reporting mechanisms."' These reporting mechanisms provided a means of making all members of the ILO accountable
for all four of the areas of fundamental rights enunciated in the Declaration, even if they had not ratified one or more of the applicable Conventions developing those rights. z 6 While the language of the Annex
spoke of the follow-up as being merely "promotional" and intended to
250. See Anthony G. Freeman, Child Labor'sImpact on Free Trade, CONG. TESTIMONY, Oct.
22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14152423.
251. See id.
252. See id
253. See id.
254. See generally International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session (June 1998), at Annex (visited Feb. 13, 1999)
<http:/lwww.ilo.orglpubliclenglisll0ilclilc86Com-dtxt.htm>[hereinafter ILO Declaration on
Rights at Work] (describing new reporting mechanisms); see also Freeman, supra note 250
(discussing that linking of labour standards to trade isa disguised form of protectionalism).
255. See International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, 86th Session (June 1998) Annex (visited Feb. 13, 1999)
<http://www.io.org/public/english/lOilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm> [hereinafter 1LO Declaration on
Rights at Work].
256. See id,
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"encourage" Member nations in their efforts, 7 the developing nations
clearly fear that they will suffer economic or trade retribution based on
the new reporting mechanisms." Such retribution would be expected to
be imposed not by the ILO itself, but rather by organizations such as the
WTO, or bilaterally by developed nations.9 Hence, the difficulty faced
by the developing nations is that any guarantees as to the nature of the
reports within the Declaration cannot prevent the reports from being
used as standards by organizations other than the ILO in assigning trade
or economic benefits or punishments.2 Therefore, the issue of the reports is inseparably linked to that of "linkage" to other international organizations.
A cynic would say that most of the debate in regard to the Declaration was not over the substantive rights enunciated, but rather over the
question of whether those rights would be merely rhetorical. Workers'
groups, particularly in the developed world, were understandably eager
to see the strongest possible implementation of fundamental rights in
the workplace, and hence would ultimately perceive linkage to international organizations and to world trade rules as entirely appropriate
means of attaining social justice in the context of liberalized world
trade. Otherwise, the violation of workers' rights in the developing
world would cause the loss of workers' rights, jobs, and bargaining
position in the developed world. Wealth produced through the violation
of workers' rights is not necessarily a good, and anyway probably will
not do much to alleviate poverty, from the perspective of some workers.
However, the position of the developing world should not be reduced to a cynical desire to avoid all accountability. While that desire
may certainly exist-being a virtual universal human failing--even a
sincere workers' advocate in the developing world may fear that the developed world would exploit issues such as child labour or labour standards for their own purposes of improving the competitive trade position of the developed world. This fear is based not only on a distrust of
the developed world, but also from the unresolved ambiguities of the

257. See id. Annex § I, U[ 1, 2.
258. See, e.g., ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Discussion in Plenary), supra note
246 (statement of Ms. Janjua, Pakistan's Government Adviser).
259. See generally ILO Report on Declaration of Principles (Committee Report), supra note
241 (outlining the general dissatisfaction among developing nations with the idea of any organization but the ILO having responsibility for the follow-up mechanisms of the Declaration).
260. Cf. id. 378 (discussing Mr. Samet's, United States Government Delegate, statement
that ILO members retain the "right to condition the extension of trade benefits on labour standards").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

45

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 16:383

linkage issue. Most would admit, for example, that it would be unfair to
subject the developing world to precisely the same labour standards as
the developed world. But there is no general agreement on the precise
point at which lower minimum age or other labour standards constitute
an unfair trade advantage for developing nations. Moreover, the limited
provisions within the Minimum Age Convention for developing nations
to apply lower standards have not induced many developing nations to
adhere to the Convention."" The attempt of the Declaration to make developing nations accountable for so-called "fundamental rights" in Conventions they have not ratified thus raises an unresolved issue of how
much variance developing nations should be permitted from child labour and other labour standards before some kind of punitive trade or
economic measures are employed.
2. Proposed Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour

a. Introductory Considerations
The ILO hopes to adopt in June 1999 a new convention and accompanying recommendation on the abolition of the worst forms of
child labour, a draft of which was discussed at the June 1998 International Labour Conference.262 The purpose of this Convention is to target
the worst forms of child labour for immediate elimination.2 63 Thus the
ILO, while adhering to its long term goal of the progressive and complete elimination of child labour, is attempting in this Convention to
identify and target the most extreme or intolerable form of child labour

261. See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supranote 230, art. 4(1) (allowing for nations

to exclude limited categories of work from the application of the Convention if problems of application arise); id. art 5(1) (allowing insufficiently developed nations to limit the scope of the application of the Convention).
262. See International Labour Conference, Report IV(1) on Child Labour, 87th Session (June
1999) (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http:lwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilc/ilc87/rep-iv-l.htni>
(addressing section entitled "Proposed Convention concerning the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labour") [hereinafter Proposed Convention]; see also International Labour Organization Press Release, FundamentalRights DeclarationClears FinalHurdle; ILO Conference Seeks End to Child Labour Abuses (June 18, 1998) (visited Feb. 2, 1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/235press/pr/1998/28.htm>
(addressing
section
entitled
"Discussions on the worst forms of child labour") [hereinafter ILO Press Release, Fundamental
Rights DeclarationClearsFinalHurdle].
263. See Proposed Convention, supra note 262, pmbl.
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for prioritized action. The proposed Convention must, of course, be
placed in the context of existing international legal standards on child
labour. The 1973 Minimum Age Convention and Recommendation remain, according to the draft preamble of the proposed new Convention,
the "fundamental instruments with a view to achieving the total aboli' The difficulty with the 1973 Convention, howtion of child labour."264
ever, is the paucity of ratifications, and particularly the lack of ratifications from developing countries containing the majority of child
labourers.2 65 Thus, the ILO, without admitting to defeat in regard to its
campaign to increase ratifications of Minimum Age Convention, is
clearly acknowledging that it does not anticipate general ratification of
the Minimum Age Convention in the near future.
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") has,
however, achieved very wide ratification.266 Article 32 of the CRC requires State Parties to protect children from "economic exploitation and
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere
with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. ' 267 Article 32
further requires State Parties to provide for minimum ages for employment and regulation of the hours and conditions of employment.2 6' Article 34 of the CRC requires State Parties to protect children from sexual
exploitation, including prostitution and pornography. 269 Article 35 requires State Parties to prevent the abduction, sale, and traffic in children, and therefore addresses various forms of child slaveryY0 The preamble to the proposed ILO Convention references the CRC." In view
of the overlap between the CRC and the ILO proposed Convention, the
obvious question is whether the proposed Convention adds anything
useful to existing international standards.

264. Id.
265. See ILO Press Release, FundamentalRights Declaration Clears Final Hurdle, supra
note 262.
266. See generally CRC, Status: The First Nearly Universally Ratified Human Rights Treaty
in History, at 1 (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.unicef.org/crc/status.htm> (indicating that only
two States, the United States and Somalia, have not yet become party to the Convention)
[hereinafter CRC, Status].
267. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Part I: Substantive Provisions, art. 32(1) (visited
Feb. 4, 1999) <http:llwww.unicef.orglcrc/partl.htm> [hereinafter CRC, Part I].
268. See id. art. 32 (2).
269. See id. art. 34.
270. See id. art. 35.
271. See Proposed Convention, supra note 262, pmbl.
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The preamble to the draft Convention also references the ILO
Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956).2 These pre-existing
international conventions also substantially overlap with the proposed
new ILO Convention, and again raise the issue of what the proposed
Convention adds to existing international law.
b. Substantive Provisions:Defining and Eliminating the "Worst Forms
of ChildLabour"
The relevant text of the proposed Convention requires ratifying
State Parties to "take measures to secure the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labour,"2" which are defined as:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as
the sale and trafficking of children, forced or compulsory labour, debt bondage and serfdom;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for
the production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal activities,
in particular for the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances as defined in the relevant international treaties;
(d) any other type of work or activity which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to jeopardize
the health, safety or morals of children.274
A "child" is defined as "all persons under the age of 18." 2 This
creates an international definition of "child" which would apparently
override national definitions with younger ages of majority. Even in the
United States, someone underage who marries may achieve adult status.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See id.
Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 2.
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The ILO proposed definition is more rigid than that in the CRC, which
defines a child as "every human being below the age of 18 years unless,
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier. ' 27 6 The
justification of the rigid definition is theoretically that the proscribed
forms of labour are so heinous that a clear and fixed age-line should be
drawn.
The fixed international definition of "child" may cause difficulties
in regard to the prohibitions against child prostitution and child pornography, particularly for nations with a lower national age of majority
and/or consent and no legal prohibition of adult prostitution or pornography.2 " Indeed, even where adult prostitution and pornography are illegal, they generally would be treated much more leniently than child
prostitution and child pornography, and hence it is critically important
where the line between adult and child is drawn. If a nation generally
considers a sixteen or seventeen year old an adult, it may be culturally
and legally awkward to define their employment in prostitution and
pornography as the heinous crimes of child prostitution and child pornography. A seventeen year old in many societies may not appear to be
a "child" in regard to sexual matters, yet may appear indistinguishable
from someone in the "adult" age range of eighteen to twenty. This
problem is greatest for those who take an amoral or libertarian position
in regard to adult prostitution and pornography, while seeking to maintain a highly moral and prohibitory position on child prostitution and
pornography. For those who generally view prostitution as exploitative
and destructive of the prostitute, and both prostitution and pornography
as destructive of the broader society, the difficulty posed is much less
severe, as the fixed definition of "child" may effectively broaden the
scope of the prohibition against these evils. Regardless of one's moral
or ideological position on these matters, it is clear that enforcement at
the upper ages could be difficult, particularly in societies where the
methods of registering birth are still unreliable and hence where the exact ages of many are uncertain. Moreover, just as "statutory rape" laws
with high ages of consent are widely ignored and violated where adult
fornication has been de-criniinalized and is culturally common, international child prostitution and pornography laws applicable through age

276. CRC, Part I, supra note 267, art. 1.
277. See Vitit Muntarbhorn, InternationalPerspectives and Child Prostitution in Asia, in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FORCED LABOR: THE PROSTITUTION OF CHILDREN 9, 10 (1996)
(noting difficulty of applying laws against "child prostitution" to those under eighteen but above
the age of legal consent under national law).
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seventeen may prove difficult to enforce in societies where prostitution
and pornography are widespread.
The substantive definition of the "worst forms of child labour" include most of the practices which are broadly considered particularly
egregious, such as bonded child labour, forced child labour, child prostitution, and particularly hazardous forms of employment." For example,
the Chair's Summary of the February 1997 Amsterdam Child Labour
Conference had defined the most intolerable forms of child labour as
"slavery and slave-like practices, forced or compulsory labour, including debt bondage and serfdom, the use of children in prostitution, pornography and the drugs trade, and their employment in any type of work
that is dangerous, harmful or hazardous." 279 The Amsterdam Conference
had also called for prohibitions of work that "interferes with [children's]
education," and a "total prohibition of work by the very28 young," but
these are not specifically included in the draft Convention. 1
Sections (a) and (b) of the definition of "worst forms of child labour" concerning various forms of bonded child labour, child prostitution and child pornography apply to some of the most universally condemned forms of child labour." The subject matters of these sections
are already covered by other provisions of international law. There are
several significant ILO and other human rights instruments on all forms
of slavery or slavery-like institutions that would already encompass the
prohibitions of section (a) on child slavery, bonded labour, and serfdom. 2 Similarly, the subjects of child prostitution and child pornography are already covered in the CRC and other related efforts. 83 Some
concern has been expressed regarding the inclusion of child prostitution

278. See Amsterdam Labour Conference, Putting an End to ChildAbuse (speech by Minister
Pronk)
(Feb.
26,
1997)
(visited
Feb.
11,
1996)
<http:llwww.crin.org./802566b9OO3596... 22a82802565680051 lfd2/OpenDocument>
(addressing section entitled '"an on the most intolerable forms") [hereinafter Minister Pronk].
279. Amsterdam Labour Conference, Conclusions of the Amsterdam Child Labour Conference: Chair's Summary and Conclusions of the Child Labour Conference on the Elimination of the
Most Intolerable Forms of Child Labour (Feb. 26-27, 1997) (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/chid/documentation/resolutions/ amsterdam.htm> [hereinafter
ALC, Chair's Summary].
280. Id.
281. See Proposed Convention, supra note 262, art. 3.
282. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973
(visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/seripts/convde.pl?C138>, arts. 1-7 [hereinafter
ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention]; International Labour Organization, C29 Forced Labour
Convention, 1930, art. 1 (visited Feb. 15, 1999) <http:llilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scriptslconvde.pl7C29 >
[hereinafter ILO C29 Forced Labour Convention].
283. See CRC, Part I, supranote 267, art. 34.
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and pornography, which are generally classified as criminal matters, in
an ILO instrument on labour standards.2 4 It will seem odd to some to
consider these activities as a form of "labour" or to regulate it as a part
of international labour standards. The official ILO position on this
question appears to argue that it is useful to encompass all of these
matters in one instrument, and that since they involve economic transactions these activities can be considered "labour." Nonetheless, it is
clear that the ILO is venturing into areas typically handled as criminal,
rather than labour, matters. Moreover, the Convention uses encompassing terms like "practices," "activity," and "activities" as implicit definitions of "labour," again indicating a willingness to expand its jurisdiction beyond matters usually considered as "labour."
Section (c) of the definition of the "worst forms of child labour"
appears unwisely broad. While the Amsterdam Conference spoke particularly of children in prostitution, pornography, and the drug trade,' 5
the proposed Convention creates a separate category of "illegal activities," of which the drug trade is a "particular" instance.! 6 The language
is somewhat ambiguous, in that it almost seems to imply that the drug
trade is the only prohibited activity, while at the same time creating a
broader category of using children in "illegal" activities which is potentially quite broad. Presumably there would be no need to create the
broader category of "illegal activities" if the specified instance of drug
use was the only item in the category. Banning the "use, procuring or
offering of a child for illegal activities"' has the benefit of going beyond the drug trade to encompass other potentially dangerous uses of
children, but also has the corresponding difficulty of becoming a prohibition that suffers from overbreadth. The most obvious example of
possible overbreadth (for an American) would be the deliberate decision
by the Reverand Martin Luther King, Jr., to use children as protesters

284. See International Labour Conference, Report VI(2) on Child Labour, 86th Session (June
1998) (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilclilc86/rep-vi.htm>
(addressing "Subparagraphs (a) and (b)" of question seven of section entitled "Content of a Convention" which discusses the fact that some countries raised concerns about referring to child pornography and prostitution as "work" and that putting them in a labour convention might devalue
their criminal aspect) [hereinafter ILC Report VI(2)].
285. See Minister Pronk, supra note 278 (addressing sections entitled "Facilitation" and
"Step-by-step approach").
286. See International Labour Conference, Report IV(l) on Child Labour, 87th Session, art.
3(c) (June 1999) (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.ilo.orglpublic/englishllOilc/ilc87/rep-ivl.htm> (addressing section entitled "Proposed Convention concerning the prohibition and immediate elimination of the worst forms of child labour") [hereinafter Proposed Convention].
287. Id.
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during the course of his Birmingham civil rights campaign, a decision
that, under the laws of that time, probably involved the use of children
in "illegal activities." A political campaign that employed seventeen
year olds to post campaign posters on public property near roads (which
is widely done, but technically illegal, in some jurisdictions) would
come under this prohibition. Given the broad number of activities
deemed "illegal" in the modem world, it seems rather too encompassing
to brand as an "extreme form of child labour" every such "use, procuring or offering."" This is particularly true, in that the fixed definition of
a child as including every person under eighteen could encompass some
persons judged as adults under their national law.u9 This section again
illustrates the tendency of the Convention to go beyond matters usually
included within labour standards to encompass traditional areas of
criminal jurisdiction. Here, however, since the term "illegal" arguably
may include civil, as well as criminal violations, the broad language of
the proposed Convention threatens to sweep into virtually every subject
area regulated by law.
The difficulty with the breadth of section (c) was recognized by the
International Labour Office, which noted that the provision might encompass a, "theatrical production for children that involved a breach of
copyright.' 2 ° The Office has proposed the prohibition of "illicit," rather
than "illegal," activities.29" ' It is not clear, however, that this change
would resolve the potential overbreadth and vagueness of this provision.
Section (d) of the definition of "worst forms of child labour" in the
proposed Convention largely tracks a similar prohibition of hazardous
employment by all under the age of eighteen in the Minimum Age Convention.' However, although the phrase "likely to jeopardize the
health, safety or morals" is identical in both Conventions, the 1973
Minimum Age Convention allows for the employment of sixteen year
olds in such employment where protections and training are available,293
whereas the proposed Convention appears to contain a rigid prohibition.Y4 Indeed, a prior draft of the Convention specified that children
"should not be used or engaged in such work or activity under any cir-

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. art. 3(c).
See id. art. 2.
Proposed Convention, supra 286, art. 3.
See id.
See ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 282, art. 3(3).
See id.
See Proposed Convention, supra note 286, art. 3(d).
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cumstances." 295 Although this language was deleted, the portion remaining still lacks an exception provision parallel to that present in the
Minimum Age Convention." 6 This conflict between the Minimum Age
Convention and Proposed Convention provisions on hazardous employment was explicitly recognized in discussions at the 1998 ILO Conference. 7 Thus, it appeared that the ILO was trying to gain an implicit
repeal of that part of the Minimum Age Convention allowing sixteen
and seventeen year olds to be employed in hazardous categories of work
where sufficient protections and training are provided. This implicit repeal appears related to the change in terminology for those in this sixteen to seventeen year old age group, from "young persons" in the
Minimum Age Convention to "children" in the proposed Convention.
This change of terminology reflects the possible policy direction of the
ILO, for the ambiguity in terminology regarding sixteen and seventeen
year olds reflects the unresolved issue of whether the ILO hopes to
eventually make eighteen the minimum age of employment as a part of
its "effective abolition of child labour."
It is somewhat surprising to find that a convention designed to
draw far wider ratification than the Minimum Age Convention is designed to stiffen, in at least one respect, the requirements of that Convention. However, when this conflict with the Minimum Age Convention was pointed out at the June 1998 ILO Conference, ILO officials
admitted the conflict but then suggested that the exception in the Minimum Age Convention would be respected. 298 Thus, the Convention removed the language specifying no derogation, and ILO officials suggested that the language referring to the "nature" or "circumstances" of
the child labour would implicitly include the exception for sixteen and
seventeen years olds in the Minimum Age Convention.2 9 Under this interpretation, hazardous work which could be made safe for sixteen year
olds through protective measures and training would be considered to be
done under such "circumstances" so as not to be deemed hazardous by
the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 30 The difficulty

295. ILC Report VI(2), supra note 284 (addressing "Subparagraph (c)" of question seven of
"Content of a Convention" section).
296. See discussion supra p. 434 and notes 292-93.
297. See ILC Report VI(2), supra note 284 (addressing question six of section entitled
"Content of a Convention").
298. See id. (addressing paragraph "Yemen" of question six of section entitled "Content of a
Convention").

299. See id. n.15.
300. See id.
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with this interpretation is that the "nature or circumstances" phrase is
identical in both the 1973 Minimum Age Convention and the proposed
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, and yet in the former
Convention the phrase is not deemed, in itself, to create an exception to
the prohibition, but instead reliance is placed on an explicit exception.
Reading an exception into the identical language in the subsequent convention would seem somewhat illogical, even if the language itself
might seem to offer some basis for it. If an exception equivalent to that
in the 1973 Minimum Age Convention is intended, then it should be
explicitly stated in the proposed Convention, so as to remove any possible doubt as to the relationship between the two conventions in this
area.
Another slight difference between the provisions in the 1973 Convention and the proposed Convention banning hazardous work is that
the 1973 Convention refers to "employment or work,"' ' whereas the
proposed Convention refers to "work or activity."3 This use of the
word "activity," as noted above, tends to broaden the reach of 1LO conventions far beyond the traditional jurisdiction of labour standards. For
example, there are a number of recreational activities which could literally come within the broad language of an "activity which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to jeopard3 3 It is difficult to believe
ize the health, safety or morals of children.""
that the ILO intends to take jurisdiction over issues such as the physical
safety of contact sports or dirt biking for minors, or the moral safety of
various forms of recreational activities such as viewing violent or pornographic visual or audio media, but the literal language is broad
enough to encompass such issues. The ILO can attempt to diffuse these
difficulties by simply noting that it only has jurisdiction over labour
standards, but the question of what comes within ILO jurisdiction is already blurred by the proposed Convention's reach into criminal matters
such as the drug trade, prostitution, and pornography. It would be more
appropriate for the ILO to clarify matters by returning to the 1973
"employment or work" language and eliminating broad references in the
proposed Convention to "activities."
The definition of the "worst forms of child labour" can be seen as a
combination of somewhat disparate elements. Sections (b) and (c) regarding child prostitution and pornography and the use of children in
301. ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention, supra note 282, at art 3(I).
302. Proposed Convention, supra note 286, art. 3(d).
303. Id.
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the drug trade and other illegal activities involve criminal conduct."
Section (a) concerns various forms of slavery or slavery-like practices
involving children, which have long been considered illegal under international law."0 Section (d) imports from the 1973 Minimum Age Convention a ban on hazardous employment for those under eighteen, but
broadens the prohibition by eliminating the exception in the Minimum
Age Convention for work made safe through regulation and training,
and by applying the prohibition to all such "activity."3 6 The Convention
therefore essentially bans child slavery, the use of children in the sex or
drug trades or other illegal activities, and work or activities hazardous to
children.
The Convention's stated purposes are to identify the "worst forms
of child labour" for prioritized and immediate national and international
prohibition and elimination. 7 As noted above, the substantive definitions generally include most of the kinds of child labour commonly acknowledged as most egregious, such as bonded labour and child prostitution.3 However, the Convention does not in specific terms prohibit at
least two closely-related forms of child labour which could be considered particularly egregious: full-time employment by the very young,
such as children under the age of ten, and employment which makes it
impossible for children to receive at least a primary education. Instead
of particularly targeting employment of the very young, and employment interfering with education, which were named in the Chair's
summary of the February 1997 Amsterdam Child Labour Conference, 9
the proposed Convention simply adopted a stiffened version of the 1973
Minimum Age Convention's ban on hazardous employment.310 While it
could be argued that employment of the very young, or employment
which interferes with education, is hazardous to the "health" of children,
particularly given the broad World Health Organization definition of
health as total well-being of the person, this result is far from certain.
After all, unless the definition of "health" receives some more limited
definition, the prohibition of "hazardous" employment would make illegal all employment which did not maximize the entire well-being of
304.
tion and
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

See id. (addressing section entitled "Proposed Recommendation concerning the prohibiimmediate elimination of the worst forms of child labour").
See id. art. 3(a).
See id. art 3(d).
See Proposed Convention, supranote 286, pmbl., art. 1.
See discussion supra p. 43 6 and notes 304-06.
See Amsterdam Conference, Chair's Summary, supranote 279.
See Proposed Convention, supra note 286, art. 3.
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children, an impossibly broad definition for a convention supposedly
aimed at only the "worst" forms of child labour. Thus, the prohibition's
lack of specificity may prevent it from targeting effectively some forms
of child labour deemed particularly egregious by the international community, including employment of the very young and employment interfering with education. At the same time, the vagueness and potential
breadth of the prohibition of hazardous employment may undermine the
Convention's goal of receiving broad ratification. Countries which have
refused to ratify the 1973 Minimum Age Convention might refuse to
ratify a convention which contains a more prohibitive version of one of
the key provisions of that Convention.
One can speculate as to why the drafters of the Proposed Convention included a ban on hazardous employment but rejected a specific
provision on employment of the very young. Given the large number of
developing nations which have not ratified the 1973 Minimum Age
Convention, there may have been fear that including a specific age
within the proposed Convention would implicitly legitimize employment above that age, thereby undercutting the ultimate goal of total
abolition of child labour. In addition, the Amsterdam Convention had
called for a "total prohibition of work by the very young," which would
have required a definition of "work."3"' Defining "work" is a delicate
matter, for it raises the controversial issue of domestic chores. The ILO
is keenly aware that some children-particularly girls- are kept so
busy by domestic chores that they are not even permitted to attend
school."' Yet, attempting to regulate domestic chores brings one into the
heart of family autonomy, and also raises the ridiculous spectre of
regulating simple matters like a child setting the table. The LO drafters
set aside these difficulties and concentrated instead on borrowing the
hazardous employment provision of their Minimum Age Convention.""
Inclusion of the "hazardous" employment provision in the new Convention could contribute to the ILO's long term goal of a "total abolition" of child labour as a broad-scale regulation or prohibition of all
work or activity by minors. Thus, instead of undercutting their ultimate
311. ALC, Chair's Summary, supranote 279.
312. See Proposed Convention, supra note 286, 2(c)(ii); see, e.g., International Labour Organization, ChildLabour is Growing in Africa, WORLD OFWORK, No. 23 (Feb. 1998) (visited Feb.
4, 1999) <http:llwww.ilo.org/publieenglish/235presslmagazine/23/child.htm> (addressing section
entitled "The scope of the problem" which discusses the large percentage of African girls doing
full time housework) [hereinafter ILO, ChildLabour is Growing in Africa].
313. See ILC Report VI(2), supra note 282 (addressing "Hazardous Work" subsection of section entitled "Proposed Conclusions with a view to a Recommendation").
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goal of total abolition with the enactment of a new, and very young, age
limit, or getting caught in the controversial quagmire of defining "work"
in the context of domestic chores, the ILO drafters chose to advance
their long-term interest in asserting "child labour" jurisdiction over the
work or activities of minors until the age of eighteen.
Although the choices made by the ILO in drafting the substantive
definitions are quite understandable, some degree of over-reaching is
present which may endanger the goal of obtaining broad ratification of
the Convention. This article therefore proposes four alterations of the
text. First, section (c) of the definition of "worst forms of child labour"
should be re-drafted so as to delete the general inclusion of illegal activities, with the remaining part referring only to drugs. Second, section
(d) of the substantive definition, concerning hazardous activities, should
delete the reference to "activity," which is too broad a term, and retain
the language of the Minimum Age Convention, which refers to
"employment or work." Third, the following section which requires the
national authorities to identify the areas of hazardous employment
should be amended by adding the exception present in the Minimum
Age Convention for employment of sixteen and seventeen year olds
which can be made safe through regulation and training. Fourth, the
Convention should employ the definition of "child" used in the CRC,
which permits majority to be attained earlier than the age of eighteen
under national law. This definition would prevent the anomaly of persons who have, through age or marriage, become adults under national
law, being simultaneously considered "children" for international and
national child labour purposes.
While these changes narrow somewhat the reach of the Convention, they would strengthen it, by allowing it to retain its focus on the
"worst" forms of child labour. Language which makes the reach of the
Convention unusually broad, such as the prohibitions of "illegal activities," and any hazardous "activity," the failure to explicitly include a
mitigating exception present even in the unpopular Minimum Age Convention, and the use of a rigid definition of child broader than the CRC,
threaten to undermine the goal of broad ratification and to dissipate
support through the raising of side-issues. The definitions of the core
evil must be limited and clear, so that all may concentrate on the critical
issue, discussed immediately below, of implementation.
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c. Implementation
Given that essentially all of the work or activities condemned as
the "worst forms of child labour" are already condemned in other international instruments, and are almost universally condemned under national laws even in developing nations, the primary benefit of the new
instrument must come from its implementation. The ILO has traditionally relied on reporting mechanisms to enforce adherence to its conventions.314 The ILO reporting mechanisms have been somewhat more effective than those of some of the reporting mechanisms in non-ILO
human rights conventions, perhaps because of the ILO expertise in the
gathering of relevant data, and ILO's tripartite structure of governments,
employers, and workers." 5 Thus, there is some hope that the reporting
mechanisms of the ILO, in combination with the proposed Convention,
will be a helpful step, even if they do not, in itself, bring about the abolition of these "worst" forms of child labour.
The proposed Convention requires State Parties to implement
"programmes of action to eliminate as a priority the worst forms of
child labour. 3 16 As is typically the case with ILO conventions, the proposed Convention requires such programs to be designed in consultation
with employers' and workers' organizations.317 "Monitor[ing]" of the
"application of provisions" toward that end of eliminating the worst
forms of child labour is also required.3"'
Beyond these general undertakings, the proposed Convention specifically requires all "necessary measures," including the "provision and
3 9 The specific
application of penal and other sanctions, as appropriate.""
mention of penal sanctions is not surprising, given that the Convention
ban covers activities, such as prostitution, pornography, and the drug

314. See Stephanie Farrior, The InternationalLaw on Trafficking in Women and ChildrenFor
Prostitution: Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 213, 223 (1997)
(discussing the details of the ILO reporting and enforcing mechanism).
315. See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labour Link: Applying the InternationalTrading System to
Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labour, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 382 (1995) (explaining
the benefits of the ILO's tripartite system).
316. International Labour Conference, Report IV(l) on Child Labour, 87th Session, art. 6(1)
(June 1999) (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.ilo.orglpubliclenglishll0ilc/ilc87/rep-iv-l.htm>
(addressing section entitled "Proposed Convention concerning the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labour") [hereinafter Proposed Convention].
317. See id. art. 6(2).
318. d. art. 5.
319. Id. art. 7(1).
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trade, that are already usually covered under penal law. 2 This provision
underscores the reach of this "labour standard" into areas of traditional
criminal jurisdiction.
In addition, the Convention states that State Parties
shall, taking into account the importance of education in eliminating child labour, take effective and time-bound measures to:
(a) prevent children from engaging in the worst forms of child
labour;
(b) provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for
their removal from work, rehabilitation and social reintegration
through, inter alia, access to free basic education; and
(c) identify and reach out to children at special risk and take account of the special situation of girls.32
These provisions on prevention and rehabilitation understandably
emphasize education, for one of the basic harms of many forms of child
labour is that they effectively prevent children from receiving an education, and thereby severely limit the future prospects of the child.322 Some
wanted the category of work which "interferes with [children's] education" to constitute one of the "worst forms of child labour" banned by
the Convention. As a substitute, the Convention emphasized education
in the implementation section. In some developing nations with large
numbers of child labourers, the system of primary education is quite inadequate.324 Often there are no schools or other formal education available for large numbers of children, and much of the education that is
available is of a low quality."z Hence, many parents in those societies
320. See Proposed Convention, supra note 316, l 11-12 (addressing section entitled
"Proposed Recommendation concerning the prohibition and immediate elimination of the worst
forms of child labour").
321. Id. art. 7(2).
322. See discussion supra p. 440 and note 316.
323. See Proposed Convention, supranote 316, pmbl., 14.
324. See Amsterdam Labour Conference, Putting an End to Child Abuse (speech by Minister
Pronk)
(Feb.
26,
1997)
(visited
Feb.
11,
1999)
<http://www.crn.org/802566b9003596... 22a828025656800511fd2/OpenDocument>
(addressing section entitled "Step-by-step approach") [hereinafter Minister Pronk].
325. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

59

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 16:383

have yet to perceive any benefit, to either the child or family, of withholding the child from early employment.326
The educational, prevention, and rehabilitative services demanded
by the proposed Convention are arguably the most important provisions
of the Convention. Most of the "worst forms of child labour" banned by
the proposed Convention are already illegal, under national laws, in the
nations where they are most prevalent.3 27 For example, bonded labour,
and employment by children in hazardous industries, are illegal in India
and Pakistan, 32 and child prostitution is illegal in Thailand. 329 If all the
Convention required were the existence of national laws making these
practices illegal, the Convention would be an empty exercise, for those
laws already exist. Adding a requirement that laws exist, to the law's
existence, is hardly a noble calling for the international community.
The difficulty with the Convention's requirement of educational,
prevention, and rehabilitative services is that such services require substantial financial resources. Obviously, developing nations are often not
in the best position to provide the financial resources necessary to
achieve these goals. It therefore becomes a very real question as to
whether developing nations can, in good conscience, commit to providing such services in adequate amounts. While such nations can point to
some number of existing or pilot projects providing preventive or rehabilitative services to small groups of at-risk or rescued children,33
such small-scale projects cannot fulfill the requirements of the Convention to provide services adequate to achieve the "immediate elimination
of the worst forms of child labour." In some nations there are literally
millions of children already subject to the "worst forms of child labour,"
and tens of millions of other children who are "at-risk."33' The services
which would actually be necessary to rescue and rehabilitate all of the
current child labourers, and provide preventative services to all who are
at-risk, are staggering. The requirement of "immediate elimination,"

326. See id.
327. See, e.g., Jonathan Silvers, Child Labourin Pakistan, 277 THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY 79,
82 (Feb. 1996).
328. See id.
329. See Patricia D. Levan, Curtailing Thailand's Child Prostitution Through an International Conscience, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 869, 889 (1994) (discussing the many laws in
Thailand which outlaw child prostitution).
330. See, e.g., Jennifer Bol, Using the InternationalLaw to Fight Child Labour:A Case Study
of Guatemala and the Inter-American System, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1135, 1177 (1998)
(outlining some of the programs adopted by the Guatemalan government).
331. See Silvers, supra note 327, at 81.
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coupled with the requirement of services, therefore would present an
extremely expensive commitment, if taken seriously.
Developing nations, like developed nations, differ significantly in
their allocation of national financial resources to human services such as
education.332 Some developing nations could certainly be criticized for
not putting a sufficient percentage of their national resources into the
development of their future human capital, their children. Thus, the
Convention could be seen as a way of prodding nations toward placing
more resources into education and services for children and families.
However, developing nations are understandably going to consider
that they could not be expected to provide, on their own, sufficient resources to launch massive new educational, prevention and rehabilitation programs. Rehabilitation programs are particularly expensive for it
takes far more money to rescue and rehabilitate a child than to provide,
in the first instance, a basic primary education. Rehabilitation programs
tend to be small, often involving at most a few hundred children, and
yet some nations have literally hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
children who should, under the terms of the proposed Convention, receive such services. Expecting nations which currently fail to provide an
adequate primary education to millions of children to provide far more
expensive rehabilitative services to hundreds of thousands of children
seems less than realistic.
The services commitments of the proposed Convention thus could
not be accomplished without a massive reallocation of resources within
those nations. Even with such a re-allocation, large-scale infusions of
outside financial resources would almost certainly be required. Yet,
there is no provision within the Convention for such a large-scale infusion of financial resources. The Convention's statement that ILO members "shall ...assist one another in giving effect to the provisions of
' falls
this Convention through international cooperation or assistance" 333
far short of a concerted program to channel billions of dollars of immediate assistance toward massive new education, prevention, and rehabilitative programs.
The proposed Convention's section on education, prevention, and
rehabilitation therefore points in the correct direction but threatens,
when coupled with the Convention's emphasis on immediate elimina-

332. See id. at 7 (discussing Pakistan's failure to provide schooling for more than a third of its
children despite its relative prosperity); see also Jennifer Bol, supra note 330, at 1182 (discussing
different levels of social spending, including education, in Central American countries).
333. Proposed Convention, supra note 316, art. 8.
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tion, to create a credibility crisis. Such credibility gaps, as discussed
above, are common in the human rights field, where nations seem to
frequently ratify human rights conventions with little regard or concern
as to actually abiding by their terms.3 4 These credibility crises have
been severe in regard to civil and political rights, for it is generally
considered that nations should be able to control whether they suppress
free speech or engage in torture, and therefore should be able to bring
themselves into immediate compliance with their human rights commitments in such areas.3 5 Traditionally, however, credibility crises have
arisen less often in regard to positive economic and social rights, such
as rights guaranteeing adequate food, education, or health care. Conventions concerning positive economic or social rights have wisely been
phrased in terms of progressive implementation, based on the understanding that such positive rights require a long-term process of economic and social development for their implementation.336
The proposed Convention is an oddity in the field of human rights
for it guarantees positive economic rights, enactment of laws barring
certain practices, and criminal and civil enforcement of those laws,
while claiming to demand immediate compliance with its standards. It
will not be difficult for ratifying nations to meet their commitment to
enact the relevant laws making these forms of child labour illegal because, as noted above, such national laws are already nearly universal.
Finding and allocating the necessary resources for services, however, is
a matter which normally could not occur "immediately." Further, effective enforcement of laws making these forms of child labour illegal is
likely to take a period of time, if it is accomplished at all, in nations
where it has become customary for enforcement to be ineffective and
lax.
The undertaking demanded by the Convention is to "take measures
to secure the prohibition and immediate elimination of the worst forms
of child labour. 3 37 Nations which adhere to the Convention will undoubtedly claim that they have "taken steps" toward the goal. The

334. See, e.g., Gustavo Capdevila, Human Rights: U.N.Accuses Governments of Double Talk
on Migrants,Inter Press Service (Nov. 30, 1998), availablein 1998 WL 19901747.
335. See, e.g., Frank Ching, U.S.-China Ties Make Headway, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 2,
1998, at 35 (discussing that China has signed human rights conventions, yet the U.S. Congress has
passed nonbinding resolutions urging President Clinton to mount another attempt to condemn
China's human rights record).
336. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 200A,
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 2(1) (1966) [hereinafter ESCR].
337. Proposed Convention, supranote 316, art. 1.
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credibility crisis will emerge from the fact that anything short of a massive infusion of resources into both services and enforcement efforts
will obviously fall short of immediate abolition. Indeed, it is hard to believe that immediate abolition is a credible goal, given the significant
financial and cultural obstacles toward abolishing practices such as
bonded labour, employment of children in hazardous industries, and
child prostitution.
In addition, there is a danger that efforts toward abolition could do
more harm than good, if they are not undertaken in a phased and controlled way.3 For example, large factories are the easiest target for enforcement efforts, and hence governments may be inclined to demonstrate compliance through removing children immediately from a few
large factories. If children are merely removed from formal factory jobs,
however, without rehabilitation, educational, and income-replacement
services being available, then they will likely move to less regulated,
more hazardous, and more poorly-paid forms of employment 9 Hence,
child labour may simply be moved further underground, and children
subject to greater, rather than lesser, dangers.' Therefore, efforts at
abolishing the "worst forms of child labour" should ensure that enhanced enforcement efforts are provided in coordination with increased
services. The provision of necessary services, however, is unlikely to
occur "immediately," but can only develop as funds and adequate planning and implementation permit.
For all of these reasons, it seems that the Convention's goal of immediate elimination of the "worst forms of child labour" must be taken
less than literally. Much good will have been done, and a credibility
crisis avoided, if a decade after enactment the evils against which the
Convention is aimed, such as bonded child labour, the use of children in
the sex and drug industries, and the employment of children in hazardous industries, have been significantly and progressively reduced
through an integrated program of significantly increased enforcement of
national child labour laws and expanded services. Even accomplishing
this much will require extraordinary efforts. On the other hand, if a decade later there is no significant reduction in these practices, national
child labour laws continue to receive only sporadic and symbolic en338. See, e.g., Nicole J. Krug, Exploiting Child Labour: CorporateResponsibility and the
Role of CorporateCodes of Conduct, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 651, 665-66 (describing the
way sudden unemployment of children in the Bangladesh garment industry made their living
conditions worse).
339. See id. at 666.
340. See id.
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forcement efforts, and increases in educational, prevention, and rehabilitative services are limited to a few pilot projects, then the proposed
Convention will join the ranks of merely rhetorical efforts in the human
rights field.
IV.CONCLUSION

As the above analysis indicates, recent ILO efforts to place child
labour in the center of the organization's efforts evidence a certain
measure of over-reaching, in that they assume or seek to impose a degree of consensus not actually present in the international community:4 '
Thus, ILO efforts to bind all of their member nations to the abolitionist
goal of the unpopular 1973 Minimum Age Convention through the new
Human Rights Declarations violate the principle that nations are only
bound by the conventions they ratify. Similarly, some of the terms used
to define the "worst forms of child labour" in the proposed Convention
on this subject are overbroad and appear to represent an attempted expansion of ILO jurisdiction even beyond that of the unpopular Minimum Age Convention, making it less likely that this Convention will
overcome the resistance of developing nations to ratification of child
labour conventions.
This overreaching is unlikely to produce any significant resistance
at the present time, largely because the definitions of human rights
found in international declarations and conventions are so often regarded as largely rhetorical exercises, and therefore as not particularly
significant. In addition, since there understandably are no reputable actors in the international arena willing to publicly defend the more egregious forms of child labour, activists against such evils generally are afforded a certain measure of tolerance for over-reaching and rhetorical
excess in pursuit of their laudable goals.
The ILO and other activists in the child labour movement currently
lack any mechanism for effectively enforcing their ever-growing number of conventions and declarations. 342 The child labour movement, like
341. See International Labour Organization Press Release, FundamentalRights Declaration
ClearsFinalHurdle; ILO Conference Seeks End to Child LabourAbuses (June 18, 1998) (visited
Feb. 2, 1999) <http:llwww.ilo.org/public/english/235press/pr/1998/28.htm> [hereinafter ILO Press
Release, FundamentalRights DeclarationClearsFinal Hurdle]; International Labour Conference,
Report VI(2) on Child Labour, 86th Session (June 1998) (visited Feb. 25, 1999)
<http://www.ilo.org/public/englishlOilc/ilc86/rep-vi.htm> (addressing paragraph entitled "United
States" under "General observations" of "Introduction" section) [hereinafter ILC Report VI(2)].
342. See Ehrenberg, supra note 314, at 389. "The lack of sanctions is a major weakness in the
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the human fights movement, generally relies on a combination of reporting, publicity, research, and volunteer efforts to enforce its norms.2 3
These efforts are significant but have thus far failed to stem the economic forces, international and local, which make egregious forms of
child labour such a pervasive part of the contemporary world. Unfortunately, economic growth in itself does not guarantee a lessening of child
labour because its benefits may be controlled by elites and therefore
may fail to provide any immediate improvement in the lives of the
masses of poor in the developing world. In addition, economic growth
and free trade can increase markets for the goods and services created
by child labour, and thus increase local demand for child labourers. The
economic forces unleashed by economic growth are, however, at least
theoretically capable of being directed to the alleviation of social evils
such as child labour, because they create an extra margin of wealth in
both the developed and developing world which conceivably could be
re-directed to the alleviation of human suffefing.' The relentless advocacy of the child labour movement is thus theoretically capable, in good
economic times, of producing a significant reduction of child labour. By
contrast, however, economic crises are almost certain to exacerbate the
child labour problem because they remove the resources and focus necessary to the movement, and re-direct them to issues of crisis management and simple survival. 4' Hence, the current economic crisis in Asia
may pose a significant danger to the movement. If the economic crisis
widens and spreads economic pain throughout the developing world,
then the prospects for making headway against child labour, using the
very limited enforcement mechanisms of the human rights community,
will be slight indeed.
The parts of the world where child labour is most endemic are
subject to extremely high rates of economic and cultural change which
make their present societies relatively unstable and their futures quite
uncertain.Y6 Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world are in
transition from age-old agricultural and village patterns of life to van-

ILO's procedure because it allows persistent violations to continue." Id.
343. See International Labour Conference, Report IV(l) on Child Labour, 87th Session, § M
(June 1999) (visited Jan. 29, 1999) <http:llwww.ilo.orglpublic/englishlOilc/ilc87/rep-iv-l.htm>
[hereinafter Proposed Convention].
344. See Anthony G. Freeman, Child Labor's Impacton FreeTrade, CONG. TESTIMONY, Oct.
22, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 14152423.

345. See id.
346. See SAMtEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 97 (1996).
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ous forms of modem, industrial, and post-industrial conditions.Y7 Much
of the developing world is experiencing in a few generations changes
which occurred over several hundred years in the developed world.4'
This high rate of change has produced in many peoples an identity crisis
and an accompanying resurgence of ethnic and religious identity, as
people are forced to explicitly choose and value that which they may
have previously taken for granted 49 Under these conditions, the norms
and ideals by which people govern their lives are in significant flux, and
change is not always in the direction of Western individualism. 50 At the
same time, the global economic system is unrelenting and unforgiving
in its constant intrusion into the lives of peoples throughout the world,
making it increasingly difficult for local communities to maintain control over their own fates.35'
Under these circumstances, the prospects for producing a fixed
condemnation of child labour in all of the emerging and re-emerging
value systems of the world seems dim. Every society values at least
some of their children, but not every society agrees on what is good for
children, or on the correct mix of work and education which best fulfills
children's present duties toward their families while preparing them for
adulthood.
The multiplicity of values manifest in the resurgent ethnic and religious communities of the world suggests that resistance to the universalizing moralism of the human rights community are inevitable at the
local level. It is this local level which is least represented in international and human rights documents, for those documents almost inevitably are the products of those privileged few who participate in international institutions. Some international efforts to implement human
rights carefully nourish support and relationships in the local communities in which they work. However, there is no foreseeable possibility
that the innumerable villages and poor urban neighborhoods of the developing world will each be reached by international efforts to work cooperatively with local leaders in planning and implementing local improvements. Therefore, when international human rights documents and
conferences take aim at altering local attitudes in order to conform them
to international norms, they generally speak as virtual strangers to those
347. See id.
348, See id.

349. See id.
350. See id. at 193, 196.
351. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISsBRoT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 516 (2d cd.
1996).
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to whom they address. The local communities, filled with people who
have the "wrong attitudes" on matters like child labour, family size, and
gender, are more demonized than converted, dictated to rather than collabourated with. Under these circumstances, the child labour movement,
like the international human rights movement with which it has cast its
lot, is unlikely to universalize its norms through cooperative work on
the local level. Given the movement's limited resources, its local projects, however laudable and successful, will generally remain pilot or
relatively small-scale projects which reach only a small minority of
child labourers, and its capacity to implement its norms will therefore
come primarily from forces outside of those communities.
The child labour movement, however, unlike much of the rest of
the human rights movement, has potentially available an international
institutional mechanism powerful enough to actually enforce its norms.
Since the child labour issue is an economic issue with significant impact
on the world trade system, it could theoretically seek enforcement of
child labour standards from the institutions of the world trade system,
such as the WTO, or from other international economic institutions,
such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. These international institutions are generally subject to significant control by the developed world and have a demonstrated capacity to impose their will,
through the power of wealth, upon developing nations.352 Institutions
powerful enough to force developing nations to alter their domestic
economic policies in ways that create significant economic pain to the
national population, or to enforce a regimen of international trade governing sensitive matters such as tariffs on imports and subsidies for local industries, probably possess the raw power to actually force developing nations to significantly step up their enforcement efforts against
various forms of child labour. Indeed, in the current era national governments appear to possess less and less authority even within their own
borders, while international economic actors such as multi-national corporations and world trade and economic institutions are growing increasingly powerful. Under such circumstances, the use of such international economic institutions in the campaign against child labour could
be quite strategic.
So far, however, the child labour campaign has made only piecemeal use of the international trade strategy. Consumer boycotts, consumer labeling efforts, agreements worked out with national export in-

352.

See id.
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dustries such as the Pakistan Carpet Exporters, and Codes of Conduct
imposed by multi-national corporations upon their suppliers have recently been employed by child labour advocates. 53 Most of these efforts
are too new to be fairly evaluated for effectiveness, but it is already apparent that they possess real potential power. Their main danger, however, is that they will salve the conscience of Northern consumers and
activists without actually substantially assisting the children of the developing world. Such efforts are likely to target the more visible-and
sometimes less heinous-forms of child labour found in larger factories
and plantations, with the primary effect of simply driving children into
forms of labour which are less visible but even more hazardous. In addition, Northern demands to monitor all phases of production in the developing world may force some businesses to move away from their
current use of family, village, and small shop production. Such a change
could produce severe hardships for those families who had previously
been able to earn their living in their own homes and localities, and
force a centralization of labour into larger, more easily regulated units,
with complex and intrusive effects in many communities. Finally, although most of these trade-oriented attacks upon child labour purport to
coordinate the provision of education, rehabilitation, and incomereplacement services with the abolition of child labour, it is likely that
the provisions of services will lag far behind the removal of child labourers, as firing a worker is much cheaper and easier than supplying
services to children and their families.
Activists involved in the varied piece-meal trade-oriented attacks
on child labour are presumably aware of these difficulties. Evaluating
their work will be complex. Some forms of child labour are so heinous
that they justify virtually any method of stopping them; in other cases,
however, one has to carefully evaluate whether the positive changes
outweigh the negative. What is intriguing about such efforts, however,
is that they involve non-governmental efforts to employ the economic
power of the developed world, and of world trade, to force changes in
labour practices in the developing world.

353. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, BY THE
SWEAT & Tom OF CHILDREN: CONSUMER LABELS AND CHILD LABOR 5 (1997). See generally U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, THE APPAREL INDUSTRY
AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE CHILD LABOR PROBLEM? (1996) (reporting on the

use of child labor in the production of apparel in the United States market and the extent to which
United States apparel importers have established and are implementing codes of conduct prohibiting the use of child labor in the industry).
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In the long term, however, the child labour movement may be
tempted to seriously pursue formal linkage between child labour standards and the World Trade Organization or other major international
economic actor. At present, serious obstacles to this path include the
general failure of linkage between labour standards and trade standards,
the unpopularity of the Minimum Age Convention, and the intense opposition of many developing nations to such linkage. These factors are
apparently sufficient to avoid formal linkage at present. If, however, the
proposed Convention on the "worst forms of child labour" is widely
ratified by developing nations, and the piece-meal efforts to use trade to
enforce child labour standards are markedly successful, then in time the
world community may come to consider that some forms of child labour
are, like slave labour, sufficiently serious to merit formal linkage. At
that time, a test case could develop in which a small nation with a significant export industry which still relied to a large degree on one of the
worst forms of child labour would be targeted for trade sanctions.
Hence, the Convention on the worst forms of child labour may ultimately be the vehicle through which linkage is finally accomplished. To
further this end, there will probably be further claims that abolition of
many of the worst forms of child labour constitute peremptory norms
binding on the entire world community, including the world trade regimen. In the meantime, however, the ILO is in the paradoxical position
of reassuring the developing world that it will never work in other than
a completely cooperative, voluntary manner with developing nations,
and hence would never try to employ the economic muscle of the developed world or of international trade or economic institutions to implement child labour standards.
The campaign to abolish child labour is in most respects one of the
more admirable social movements of the late twentieth century. One can
only hope that as it moves into the twenty-first century, it will successfully navigate the various tensions and temptations to which it is subject, and succeed in freeing millions of children from the exploitation
and degradation to which so many are now tragically subject.
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